American Political Institutions

MIT | 17.202 | Spring 2025 | Wed 4–6 | E53-485

Professor Devin Caughey

Last updated: February 22, 2025

Overview
This is the PhD program’s field seminar on American political institutions. Substantively, it covers various structural aspects of the American state—Congress, federalism, and so on—as well as “endogenous” institutions such as political parties and public policies. Unlike its counterpart on American political behavior (17.200), this course focuses mainly on politicians and other political elites rather than the mass public, though of course the mass–elite distinction is not always clear or useful. Like 17.200, however, this course is intended to give you a broad overview of its subject, as preparation for the American Politics field exam and for more specialized and research-oriented courses (e.g., 17.270, 17.212, or 17.150). As such, the readings lean towards enduring classics rather than cutting-edge research, and the assignments emphasize mastery of the material rather than the production of new research.

General information

Instructor contact information
Instructor Email Office Office hours
Prof. Devin Caughey E53-463 Wed 3–4; Thu 9–10

Resources

All resources required for this course are available on its Canvas site: https://canvas.mit.edu/courses/30274. The latest version of this syllabus can be found on the Syllabus page. PDFs of the readings assigned for each session can be found under the corresponding section of the Modules page. The Assignments page includes links to each assignment.

Assignments

The ultimate purpose of a field seminar is to provide you with a broad knowledge base of the field so that you can (1) design and teach an introductory course in the subject and (2) conduct novel research of broad interest to others in the field. The more proximate purpose is to (3) help you pass general exams. If you and I do our jobs right, you will continue to draw on what you learn in this course for the rest of your career. The assignments are intended to help you achieve these goals.

Your course grade is based on three components:

  1. Participation (20%): You are expected to attend every class session and contribute thoughtfully and respectfully to the discussion. To prepare, you are expected to do all of the assigned reading before each session.
  2. Reading notes (4 \(\times\) 5% = 20%): Reading does not mean paying equal attention to every word in a text. It is much more important that you understand the text’s basic argument, the logic and evidence that undergird that argument, and how the text relates to other works that came before and after. Writing a brief summary notes is a great way to aid your understanding and retention of a text. I encourage you to do so with every text you read, but but you will be required to turn in your reading notes for four class sessions of your choosing (except the exam weeks mentioned below). Upload them to Canvas by 4pm on the day of class. These can be informal (e.g., in bullet points) and will be graded only for completion. After the assignment deadline, they will be made visible to other students in the class.
  3. Exam questions (4 \(\times\) 15% = 60%): A four points over the course of the semester, I will post one or more simulated general exam questions. You will choose one question to answer with an essay of about 800–1,000 words (3–4 double-spaced pages). Your answer should be grounded in the texts assigned in this course (references to option or outside readings are not expected). A strong answer, however, will go beyond simple summaries of the readings and instead be organized around an argumentative thesis that answers the question. You must upload your response by 4pm on the day before class. In the next class meeting, will call on several students to defend their argument (à la the oral component of general exams).

Schedule

A detailed schedule is provided below, along with the readings and assignments for each class session. Please read the required texts in the order in which they are listed. Optional readings are for further/deeper exploration, perhaps in the future while studying for general exams. Full bibliographic references are provided at the end of the syllabus.

1. Feb. 5: Theoretical foundations

Topics

  • the new institutionalisms
  • institutions and cooperation
  • institutions and coercion
  • institutional theories and theories of institutions
  • path dependence
  • political economy

Required readings

Total: 158 pages

Optional readings

  • Levi (1988), 185–204 (bibliographic appendix)
  • North and Weingast (1989)
  • Azari and Smith (2012)
  • Sheingate (2014)
  • Olson (1965), 6–22 and 33–52 (nontechnical parts of chap. 1)

2. Feb. 12: The American state

Topics

  • the U.S. Constitution in comparative perspective
  • economic and political modernization
  • the federal government from citizens’ point of view
  • delegated governance
  • The carceral state

Required readings

  • Taylor et al. (2014), 1–114 (chap. 1–4)
  • Huntington (1966)
  • Mettler and Milstein (2007)
  • Morgan and Campbell (2011)
  • Soss and Weaver (2017)

Total: 183 pages

Optional readings

  • Mettler (2011)
  • King and Lieberman (2009)

3. Feb. 19: Organization and collective action

Topics

  • the scope of conflict and second face of power
  • institutional foundations of political organization
  • policy stakes and political mobilization

Required readings

  • Schattschneider (1960), 1–46 (chap. 1–2)
  • Walker (1983)
  • Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson (2000)
  • Strolovitch (2006)
  • Lacombe (2019)
  • Anzia (2022), 1–113 (chap. 1–4)

Total: 228 pages

Optional readings

  • Gaventa (1980), 1–21
  • Skocpol (2003), 3–73 (chap. 1–2) and 127–220 (chap. 4–5)
  • Taylor et al. (2014), 168–199 (chap. 6)

4. Feb. 26: Electoral institutions and political parties

Exam #1 due the week following this class

Topics

  • the logic of representative democracy
  • politics without parties
  • parties as endogenous institutions
  • parties as coalitions of policy demanders
  • electoral institutions
  • political geography

Required readings

  • Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999)
  • Schaffner, Streb, and Wright (2001)
  • Aldrich (2011), 3–66 (chap. 1–2)
  • Bawn et al. (2012)
  • Rodden (2019), 1–14 (introduction), 15–38 (chap. 1), and 165–196 (chap. 6)

Total: 212 pages

Optional readings

  • Taylor et al. (2014), 115–169 (chap. 5)
  • Key (1949), 298–311 (chap. 14)
  • Snyder and Ting (2003)
  • Cohen et al. (2008)
  • Achen and Bartels (2017)
  • Schickler (2016)
  • McCarty and Schickler (2018)
  • Schlozman and Rosenfeld (2019)

5. Mar. 5: Congress I: Members as individuals

Topics

  • the member–constituent relationship
  • the reelection motive
  • spatial models of congressional voting
  • the allocation of members’ time and attention

Required readings

  • R. F. Fenno Jr. (1977)
  • Jacobson (2016)
  • Sinclair (2017)
  • Poole and Rosenthal (2007), 1–31 (chap. 1–2) and 78–113 (chap. 4)
  • Sulkin (2005), 1–42, chap. 1–2
  • R. L. Hall and Deardorff (2006)

Total: 216 pages

Optional readings

  • Taylor et al. (2014), 200–226 (chap. 7)
  • Mayhew (1974)
  • R. Fenno (1978)
  • R. L. Hall (1996)

6. Mar. 12: Congress II: Rules and organization

Topics

  • institutionalization of Congress
  • endogenous rules
  • informal vs. formal modes of governance
  • rational-choice models of congressional organization
  • inter- and intra-party conflict

Required readings

  • Polsby (1968)
  • Wawro and Schickler (2006), 1–60 (chap. 1–2) and 181–210 (chap. 8)
  • Shepsle and Weingast (1994)
  • Aldrich and Rohde (2017)
  • Bloch Rubin (2021)

Total: 204 pages

Optional readings

7. Mar. 19: Congress III: Lawmaking

Exam #2 due the week following this class

Topics

  • congressional action in the shadow of electoral accountability
  • spatial models of lawmking
  • (dys)functionality of the modern Congress

Required readings

  • Arnold (1990), 3–148 (chap. 1–6)
  • Krehbiel (1998), 3–48 (chap. 1–2)
  • Curry and Lee (2019)

Total: 231 pages

Optional readings

Mar. 26: NO CLASS (Spring Break)

8. Apr. 2: The Presidency

Topics

  • the modern presidency and power to persuade
  • the president and mass media
  • presidents and political time
  • presidential appointments
  • unilateral action
  • Trump

Required readings

  • James (2005)
  • Skowronek (2006)
  • Lewis (2008), 1–79 (chap. 1–3)
  • Kriner and Reeves (2015)
  • Lowande and Rogowski (2021)
  • Lieberman et al. (2019)

Total: 210 pages

Optional readings

  • Taylor et al. (2014), 227–281 (chap. 8)
  • Neustadt ([1960] 1990)
  • Baum and Kernell (1999)
  • Dearborn (2021), ix–xii (preface) and 1–48 (chap. 1–2)
  • Moe and Howell (1999)
  • Howell (2003)

9. Apr. 9: Bureaucracy

Topics

  • motivations and behavior of bureaucrats
  • bureaucratic reputations and autonomy
  • agency rule-making
  • the politics of bureaucratic policymaking

Required readings

  • Feldman (1989), 1–114 (chap. 1–9)
  • Carpenter (2014), 1–70 (chap. 1–2)
  • Potter (2019), 1–84 (chap. 1–3)

Total: 268 pages

Optional readings

10. Apr. 16: Courts

Exam #3 due the week following this class

Topics

  • constitutions and constitutional interpretation
  • judicial decisionmaking
  • judicial policymaking

Required readings

  • Versteeg and Zackin (2016)
  • Whittington (2005)
  • Bonica and Sen (2021)
  • Gillman (2001)
  • Rosenberg (2008), 1–36 (introduction and chap. 1)
  • Kagan (2019), 3–40 (chap. 1–2)

Total: 168 pages

Optional readings

  • Taylor et al. (2014), 282–308 (chap. 9)
  • Segal and Spaeth (2002)

11. Apr. 23: Strategic interactions

Topics

  • delegation and agency problems
  • bargaining games
  • signaling games
  • politics of bureaucratic structure
  • veto bargaining
  • appointment politics

Required readings

  • McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987)
  • Moe (1989), 267–285 only
  • Epstein and Knight (1998), 1–21 (chap. 1)
  • C. Cameron and Gibson (2020)
  • C. M. Cameron and Kastellec (2023), 3–37 (chap. 1), 62–106 (chap. 3–4), and 209–236 (chap. 9).

Total: 203 pages

Optional readings

  • de Figueiredo, Jacobi, and Weingast (2006)
  • Groseclose and McCarty (2001)
  • C. Cameron and McCarty (2004)
  • Kinane (2021)
  • Canes-Wrone (2006), 19–50 (chap. 2)
  • C. M. Cameron (2000), 1–32 (chap. 1), 83–122 (chap. 4), and 178–202 (chap. 7)

12. Apr. 30: State, local, and intergovernmental politics

Topics

  • evolution of the federal system
  • intergovernmenal competition
  • local public goods and racial inequality
  • participatory institutions and land use
  • policy representation
  • democratic backsliding

Required readings

  • Derthick (2001)
  • Peterson (1981), 3–38 (chap. 1–2)
  • Trounstine (2020)
  • Grumbach (2022), 1–33 (chap. 1–2) and 151–194 (chap. 7–8)
  • Caughey and Warshaw (2022), 1–9 (chap. 1), 63–77 (chap. 5), and 113–129 (chap. 8)
  • Grossman and Hertel-Fernandez (2019) (listen to audio or read transcript)

Total: 180 pages (\(+\) 1 hour of audio)

Optional readings

  • Dahl (1961)
  • Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993)
  • Trounstine (2018)
  • Hopkins (2018)
  • Grossmann (2019)
  • Hertel-Fernandez (2019)
  • Einstein, Glick, and Palmer (2019)

13. May. 7: Policy making and policy feedback

Exam #4 due the week following this class

Topics

  • policy agendas
  • “streams” of problems, solutions, and politics
  • punctuated equilibrium
  • policy feedbacks, negative and positive

Required readings

Total: 146 pages

Optional readings

  • Lowi (1964)
  • Wilson ([1974] 1995), 327–337 (part of chap. 16)
  • Baumgartner and Jones ([1993] 2009)
  • Skocpol (1995)
  • Mettler (2002)
  • Campbell (2003)
  • Michener (2018), 1–59 (chap. 1–3)
  • Patashnik and Zelizer (2013)
  • Taylor et al. (2014), 309–359 (chap. 10)
  • Stone (1989)
  • Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002)

References

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