American Political Institutions

MIT | 17.202 | Spring 2024 | Th 9:00–11:00 | E53-485

Professor Devin Caughey

Last updated: February 21, 2024

Overview

This is the foundational graduate course on American political institutions. Whereas other courses in the PhD sequence focus on American political development (17.270) and the positive political theory of institutions (17.212), this one emphasizes classic theoretical and descriptive texts, though exemplary recent work is represented as well. The readings draw on a variety of theoretical frameworks, especially historical and rational-choice institutionalism, and employ a mix of quantitative and qualitative methodologies.

Contact

Instructor Email Office Office hours
Devin Caughey E53-463 Thursdays 11–12

Readings

I expect students to attend each class having completed all the assigned texts and prepared to discuss them. Please read them in the order in which they appear on the syllabus. All of the assigned texts are available as PDFs or ebooks and can be downloaded from the course website.

As you reflect on the readings, consider the following questions:

  • What is the research question?
  • What is the argument?
  • What empirical evidence is presented for the argument?
  • What conclusions are reached?
  • Are you convinced? Why, or why not?
  • How might the research be improved?
  • How does the reading fit with others this week and across weeks?
  • How does the reading contribute to existing understandings of American politics, both as disciplinary literature and as guides to larger understanding?

Assessment

Your course grade will be based on four components:

  1. Think pieces (4 \(\times\) 5% = 20%): One-page informal reflections on one or more readings. Each student will be assigned four sessions.
  2. Response papers (4 \(\times\) 10% = 40%): Four- or five-page critical analysis of one or more readings from the perspective of theory and/or empirics. Make a clear argument and support it. Does not require outside research but should be reasonably polished. Each student will be assigned four sessions.
  3. Final exam (30%): Like a comprehensive exam, consists of a take-home essay exam and an oral follow-up.
  4. Participation (10%): Thoughtful and respectful comments on others’ work and contributions to in-class discussion.

Think pieces and response papers will be posted to the course website 24 hours in advance, and before class the other students are expected to read and comment on them.

Schedule

1. Thursday, February 8: Theoretical Foundations

Topics

  • theoretical perspectives on the state
  • sociologial, rational-choice, and historical institutionalism
  • institutions and power
  • formal vs. informal institutions

Required readings

  • Taylor et al. (2014), 1–24 (chap. 1)
  • Levi (1988), 185–204 (bibliographic appendix)
  • P. A. Hall and Taylor (1996)
  • Diermeier and Krehbiel (2003)
  • Moe (2005)
  • Azari and Smith (2012)
  • Sheingate (2014)

Total: 143 pages

Optional readings

2. Thursday, February 15: Perspectives on the US State

Topics

  • The U.S. Constitution in comparative perspective
  • Political modernization
  • The federal government from citizens’ point of view
  • Delegated governance
  • American political economy

Required readings

  • Taylor et al. (2014), 25–167 (chap. 2–5)
  • Huntington (1966)
  • King and Lieberman (2009)
  • Mettler and Milstein (2007)
  • Morgan and Campbell (2011)
  • Hacker et al. (2022)

Total: 230 pages

Optional readings

3. Thursday, February 22: Collective Action and Organized Interests

Topics

  • the scope of conflict and the second face of power
  • collective action problems
  • interest groups

Required readings

  • Taylor et al. (2014), 168–199 (chap. 6)
  • Schattschneider (1960), 1–46 (chap. 1–2)
  • Olson (1965), 6–22 and 33–52 (nontechnical parts of chap. 1)
  • Walker (1983)
  • Strolovitch (2006)
  • Anzia (2022), 1–113 (chap. 1–4)

Total: 262 pages

Optional readings

4. Thursday, February 29: Parties and Elections

Topics

  • politics without parties
  • parties as endogenous institutions
  • parties as coalitions of policy demanders
  • parties and representation
  • electoral institutions

Required readings

  • Key (1949), 298–311 (chap. 14)
  • Aldrich (2011), 3–66 (chap. 1–2)
  • Bawn et al. (2012)
  • McCarty and Schickler (2018)
  • Snyder and Ting (2003)
  • Achen and Bartels (2016)
  • Rodden (2019), 1–14 (introduction), 15–38 (chap. 1), and 165–196 (chap. 6)

Total: 227 pages

Optional readings

  • Schaffner, Streb, and Wright (2001)

5. Thursday, March 7: Congress I: Members as Individuals

Topics

  • The member–constituent relationship
  • The reelection motive
  • Spatial models of congressional voting
  • The allocation of members’ time and attention

Required readings

  • Taylor et al. (2014), 200–226 (chap. 7)
  • Fenno (1977)
  • Jacobson (2016)
  • Poole and Rosenthal (2007), 1–31 (chap. 1–2) and 78–113 (chap. 4)
  • Sulkin (2005), 1–42, chap. 1–2
  • R. L. Hall and Deardorff (2006)

Total: 217 pages

Optional readings

6. Thursday, March 14: Congress II: Rules and Organization

Topics

  • Institutionalization and evolution of Congress
  • Rational-choice models of congressional organzation
  • Inter- and intra-party conflict

Required readings

  • Polsby (1968)
  • Sinclair (2017)
  • Shepsle and Weingast (1994)
  • Cox and McCubbins (2005), 1–49 (chap. 1–3)
  • Aldrich and Rohde (2017)
  • Lee (2016)
  • Bloch Rubin (2021)

Total: 217 pages

Optional readings

7. Thursday, March 21: Lawmaking

Topics

  • Congressional action in the shadow of electoral accountability
  • Spatial models of lawmking
  • (Dys)functionality of the modern Congress

Required readings

  • Arnold (1990), 3–148 (chap. 1–6)
  • Krehbiel (1998), 3–75 (chap. 1–3)
  • Binder (2017)
  • Curry and Lee (2019)

Total: 276 pages

Optional readings

Thursday, March 28: NO CLASS (Spring Break)

8. Thursday, April 4: Presidency I: Context and Development

Topics

  • The modern presidency and power to persuade
  • The president and mass media
  • Presidents’ position in political time
  • The idea of presidential representation
  • Trump

Required readings

  • Taylor et al. (2014), 227–281 (chap. 8)
  • Neustadt ([1960] 1990), 26–49 (chap. 3)
  • Baum and Kernell (1999)
  • Skowronek (2006)
  • Dearborn (2021), ix–xii (preface) and 1–48 (chap. 1–2)
  • Lieberman et al. (2019)

Total: 204 pages

Optional readings

9. Thursday, April 11: Presidency II: Strategic Interactions

Topics

  • Unilateral action
  • Veto bargaining
  • Presidents and the public
  • The politics of presidential appointments

Required readings

  • Cameron (2000), 1–32 (chap. 1), 69–151 (chap. 3–5), and 178–202 (chap. 7)
  • Moe and Howell (1999)
  • Canes-Wrone (2006), 19–50 (chap. 2)
  • Lewis (2008), 1–79 (chap. 1–3)

Total: 275 pages

Optional readings

  • Groseclose and McCarty (2001)
  • Kinane (2021)

10. Thursday, April 18: Bureaucracy

Topics

  • Motivations and behavior of bureaucrats
  • Political control of the bureacracy
  • The politics of bureaucratic policymaking

Required readings

  • Lipsky (1976)
  • Feldman (1989), 1–114 (chap. 1–9)
  • Potter (2019), 1–84 (chap. 1–3)
  • McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987)
  • Moe (1989), 267–285 only

Total: 270 pages

Optional readings

11. Thursday, April 25: Law and Courts

Topics

  • Constitutions and constitutional interpretation
  • Judicial decisionmaking
  • Judicial policymaking

Required readings

  • Taylor et al. (2014), 282–308 (chap. 9)
  • Whittington (2005)
  • Versteeg and Zackin (2016)
  • Epstein and Knight (1998), 1–21 (chap. 1)
  • Gillman (2001)
  • Kagan (1991)
  • Rosenberg (2008), 1–36 (introduction and chap. 1)

Total: 194 pages

Optional readings

  • Segal and Spaeth (2002)

12. Thursday, May 2: State, Local, and Intergovernmental Politics

Topics

  • Evolution of the federal system
  • Intergovernmenal competition
  • Local public goods and racial inequality
  • Participatory institutions and land use
  • Policy consequences of the Republican resurgence in the states
  • Policy representation
  • Democratic backsliding

Required readings

  • Derthick (2001)
  • Peterson (1981), 3–38 (chap. 1–2)
  • Trounstine (2016)
  • Einstein, Glick, and Palmer (2019) 1–57 (chap. 1–2)
  • Grossman and Hertel-Fernandez (2019) (listen to audio or read transcript)
  • Caughey and Warshaw (2022), 1–9 (chap. 1), 63–77 (chap. 5), and 113–129 (chap. 8)
  • Grumbach (2022), 1–33 (chap. 1–2) and 151–194 (chap. 7–8)

Total: 241 pages (\(+\) 1 hour of listening)

Optional readings

13. Thursday, May 9: Policy Making and Policy Feedback

Topics

  • Social construction of policy problems and solutions
  • Punctuated equilibrium
  • Policy feedbacks, negative and positive
  • Policy from the perspective of beneficiaries/targets

Required readings

  • Taylor et al. (2014), 309–359 (chap. 10)
  • Stone (1989)
  • Baumgartner and Jones (1991)
  • Pierson (1993)
  • Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002), 1–28 (chap. 1) and 284–380 (chap. 8–9)
  • Michener (2018), 1–59 (chap. 1–3)

Total: 320 pages

Optional readings

References

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