

Political Representation in American Politics

MIT | 17.S951 | Spring 2019 | Tu 1:00–3:00 | E53-485
<http://stellar.mit.edu/S/course/17/sp19/17.S951>

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Course Description

Intended for PhD students in political science, this course examines the topic of political representation, primarily but not exclusively in the context of American politics. In the words of Hanna Pitkin, to *represent* someone politically is to make them “present again” in the policymaking process—to stand in for the represented and act on their behalf. Although this course will discuss *descriptive representation* (representatives’ “resemblance” to their constituents), we will focus on *substantive representation* (the representation of citizens’ interests and preferences). The beginning of the course emphasizes normative and positive theories of representation, but it becomes more empirical as it progresses. Of particular interest are the mechanisms of representation (selection, sanctioning), the measurement of representation (responsiveness, congruence), and the institutional mechanisms of representation (parties, direct democracy, geographic districting, media coverage, etc.).

NB: You may notice that the assigned readings for this course include an unusually (for me, anyway) large number of my own works. In addition to the usual motivations of vanity and myopia, another reason for the overrepresentation of my own research on this syllabus is that Chris Warshaw and I are currently working on a book that synthesizes our various papers on state politics, and I hope that assigning them as readings (and hearing your thoughts on them) will help us with that project.

General Expectations

- Students are expected to **treat each other with respect**, listen attentively when others are speaking, and avoid personal attacks. At the same time, all students should feel comfortable expressing their opinions, political or otherwise, as long as they do so in an appropriate manner.

- **Plagiarism will not be tolerated** in this course. As a general rule, you should never take credit for words or ideas that are not your own, and you should give your readers enough information to evaluate the source and quality of your evidence. Self-plagiarism (reusing material you have written in another context) is also prohibited unless you receive prior permission from the instructor. For more information on academic integrity, consult <http://web.mit.edu/academicintegrity/index.html>.

Assignments

Grades in this course will be based on three components:

1. **Participation (20%):** Show up to class and contribute productively to the class discussion. Make yourself a presence, but don't crowd out your classmates.
2. **Reading responses (40%):** For 10 (out of 12 total) class meetings, write a short (1–2 double-spaced pages) reading response and post it to the course Stellar site. The response need not—and typically should not—cover all the assigned readings. Instead, focus on something interesting or surprising in a subset of them.
3. **Research paper (40%):** The final project will be a short research paper on some topic related to the study of representation. The paper should be around 15–25 pages in length, including some empirical analysis. Replication papers are accepted as long as they go beyond the original analysis in some significant way by applying theories and techniques learned in the course. Students need to meet the following milestones for their project:
 - *February to mid-March:* Start thinking about possible topics, exploring data sources, and running simple analyses on acquired data sets. Skim the readings on the syllabus to get a sense of possible topics. You should also run your ideas by me during office hours and after classes to obtain my reactions.
 - *March 26:* Turn in a brief description of your project. By this date you need to have acquired the data you plan to use and completed a descriptive analysis of the data (e.g., simple summary statistics, crosstabs, and plots). Schedule a brief meeting with me to discuss your proposal during office hours. You may be asked to revise and resubmit the proposal.
 - *May 7:* Students may give optional presentations during a time TBD (outside of class time). These presentations are optional (not graded); they are just an opportunity to get feedback. Presentations should be approximately 15 minutes in length and will be oral accompanied by electronic slides, much like presentations at major academic conferences such as APSA and MPSA.

- *May 21*: Paper due. Turn in the final version of your paper by the end of the day.

Books for Purchase

Stuart N. Soroka and Christopher Wlezien. 2012. *Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion, and Policy*. New York: Cambridge University Press

Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Devin Caughey. 2018. *The Unsolid South: Mass Politics and National Representation in a One-Party Enclave*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Semester Overview

1 February 5: Conceptualizing Representation

2 February 12: Electoral Democracy

February 19: NO CLASS (President's Day—Monday Schedule)

3 February 26: Sanctions and Adaptation

4 March 5: Selection and Turnover

5 March 12: Political Parties

6 March 19: Descriptive Representation

March 26: NO CLASS (Spring Break)

7 April 2: Substantive Representation

8 April 9: Responsiveness

April 16: NO CLASS (Patriot's Day)

9 April 23: Congruence

10 April 30: Political and Policy Feedback

11 May 7: Bias and Inequality

12 May 14: Institutions and Reforms

Course Schedule

1 February 5: Conceptualizing Representation

Required readings (66 pages):

- [PDF](#) John Stuart Mill. “Representative Government.” First published 1861. Excerpt reprinted in *The Democracy Sourcebook*, pages 312–314
- [PDF](#) Hanna Fenichel Pitkin. 1969. “The Concept of Representation.” In *Representation*, edited by Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, 1–23. New York: Atherton
- [PDF](#) Jane Mansbridge. 2003. “Rethinking Representation.” *American Political Science Review* 97 (4): 515–528
- [PDF](#) Nadia Urbinati and Mark E. Warren. 2008. “The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (1): 387–412

2 February 12: Electoral Democracy

Required readings (125 pages):

- [PDF](#) William H. Riker. “Liberalism against Populism.” First published 1982. Excerpt reprinted in *The Democracy Sourcebook*, pages 317–320
- [PDF](#) Gerry Mackie. “Saving Democracy from Political Science.” First published 2003. Excerpt reprinted in *The Democracy Sourcebook*, pages 321–325
- [PDF](#) Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Carol Stokes. 1999. “Elections and Representation.” Chap. 1 in *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan Carol Stokes, and Bernard Manin, 29–55. New York: Cambridge University Press
- [PDF](#) G. Bingham Powell. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 3–19 (chapters 1) and 20–44 (chapter 2)
- Soroka and Wlezien, *Degrees of Democracy*, pp. 1–21 (“Public Opinion and Policy in Representative Democracy”)

- Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 1–20 (chapter 1) and 21–51 (chapter 2)

February 19: NO CLASS (President’s Day—Monday Schedule)

3 February 26: Sanctions and Adaptation

Required readings (164 pages):

Representation via Accountability:

- [PDF](#) John Ferejohn. 1986. “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control.” *Public Choice* 50:5–25
- [PDF](#) Scott Ashworth. 2012. “Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (1): 183–201
- Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 90–115 (chapter 4) and 146–76 (chapter 6)
- [PDF](#) Susan Stokes. 2019. “Accountability for Realists.” *Critical Review* 30 (1–2: Democracy for Realists): 130–138. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2018.1473111>

Voter evaluations:

- [PDF](#) Stefani Langehennig, Joseph Zamadics, and Jennifer Wolak. 2019. “State Policy Outcomes and State Legislative Approval.” *Political Research Quarterly*: 1–15. Pre-published. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918823284>

Voter sanctions:

- [PDF](#) Brandice Canes-Wrone, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. 2002. “Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting.” *American Political Science Review* 96 (1): 127–140

Incumbent adaptation:

- [PDF](#) Daniel M. Butler and David W. Nickerson. 2011. “Can Learning Constituency Opinion Affect How Legislators Vote? Results from a Field Experiment.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 6 (1): 55–83

Recommended readings:

- V. O. Key. 1966. *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936–1960*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP
- Morris P. Fiorina. 1974. *Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books
- Tracy Sulkin. 2005. *Issue Politics in Congress*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Thad Kousser, Jeffrey B. Lewis, and Seth E. Masket. 2007. “Ideological Adaptation? The Survival Instinct of Threatened Legislators.” *Journal of Politics* 69 (3): 828–843
- Steven Rogers. 2017. “Electoral Accountability for State Legislative Roll Calls and Ideological Representation.” *American Political Science Review* 111 (3): 1–17
- Scott Ashworth, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, and Amanda Friedenber. 2018. “Learning about Voter Rationality.” *American Journal of Political Science* 62 (1): 37–54

4 March 5: Selection and Turnover

Required readings (116 pages):

Representation via Selection:

- [PDF](#) James D. Fearon. 1999. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance.” In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan Carol Stokes, and Bernard Manin, 55–97. New York: Cambridge University Press
- [PDF](#) Jane Mansbridge. 2009. “A ‘Selection Model’ of Political Representation.” *Journal of Political Philosophy* 17 (4): 369–398

Voters:

- [PDF](#) Michael R. Tomz and Robert P. Van Houweling. 2008. “Candidate Positioning and Voter Choice.” *American Political Science Review* 102 (3): 303–318

Candidates:

- [PDF](#) Danielle M. Thomsen. 2014. “Ideological Moderates Won’t Run: How Party Fit Matters for Partisan Polarization in Congress.” *Journal of Politics* 76 (3): 786–797

Consequences:

- [PDF](#) Anthony Fowler and Andrew B. Hall. 2017. “Long-Term Consequences of Election Results.” *British Journal of Political Science* 47 (2): 351–372
- [PDF](#) Devin Caughey, Christopher Warshaw, and Yiqing Xu. 2017. “Incremental Democracy: The Policy Effects of Partisan Control of State Government.” *Journal of Politics* 79 (4): 1–17. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/692669>

Recommended readings:

- Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate. 1997. “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (1): 85–114
- Timothy Besley. 2005. “Political Selection.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19 (3): 43–60
- Keith T. Poole. 2007. “Changing Minds? Not in Congress!” *Public Choice* 131:435–451

5 March 12: Political Parties

Background readings (familiarity assumed):

- V. O. Key Jr. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: Knopf
- Anthony Downs. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper

Required readings (158 pages):

- [PDF](#) James M. Snyder Jr. and Michael M. Ting. 2003. “Roll Calls, Party Labels, and Elections.” *Political Analysis* 11 (4): 419–444
- [PDF](#) John H. Aldrich and John D. Griffin. 2010. “Parties, Elections, and Democratic Politics.” Chap. 31 in *The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior*, edited by Jan E. Leighley, 595–610. New York: Oxford University Press
- [PDF](#) Kathleen Bawn et al. 2012. “A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics.” *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (3): 571–597

- [PDF](#) Nolan McCarty and Eric Schickler. 2018. “On the Theory of Parties.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 21:175–193
- Devin Caughey. 2018. *The Unsolid South: Mass Politics and National Representation in a One-Party Enclave*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 1–16 (chapters 1), 17–34 (chapter 2), and 106–141 (chapter 5)

Recommended readings:

- Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press

6 March 19: Descriptive Representation

Required readings (197 pages):

- [PDF](#) Jane Mansbridge. 1999. “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent ‘Yes’.” *Journal of Politics* 61 (3): 628–657
- [PDF](#) Carol M. Swain. 1993. *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, chapters 1 (pp. 3–19), 3 (pp. 47–73), 8 (pp. 170–189) and 10 (pp. 207–225)
- [PDF](#) Ebonya Washington. 2012. “Do Majority-Black Districts Limit Blacks’ Representation? The Case of the 1990 Redistricting.” *Journal of Law and Economics* 55:251–274
- [PDF](#) David E. Broockman. 2013. “Black Politicians Are More Intrinsically Motivated to Advance Blacks’ Interests: A Field Experiment Manipulating Political Incentives.” *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (3): 521–536
- [PDF](#) Sarah F. Anzia and Christopher R. Berry. 2011. “The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?” *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (3): 478–493
- [PDF](#) Dawn Langan Teele, Joshua L. Kalla, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2018. “The Ties That Double Bind: Social Roles and Women’s Underrepresentation in Politics.” *American Political Science Review* 112 (3): 525–541
- [PDF](#) Nicholas Carnes. 2015. “White-Collar Government in the United States.” *Swiss Political Science Review* 21 (2): 213–221

Recommended readings:

- David T. Canon. 1999. “Electoral Systems and the Representation of Minority Interests in Legislatures.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24 (3): 331–385
- Charles Cameron, David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1996. “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?” *American Political Science Review* 90 (4): 794–812
- David Lublin. 1999. “Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of ‘Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?’” *American Political Science Review* 93 (1): 183–186
- Katherine Tate. 2004. *Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the U.S. Congress*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Raghavendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo. 2004. “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India.” *Econometrica* 72 (5): 1409–1443
- Bernard L. Fraga. 2018. *The Turnout Gap: Race, Ethnicity, and Political Inequality in a Diversifying America*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Francesca Refsum Jensenius. 2015. “Development from Representation? A Study of Quotas for the Scheduled Castes in India.” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 7 (3): 196–220
- Kristin Kanthak and Jonathan Woon. 2015. “Women Don’t Run? Election Aversion and Candidate Entry.” *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (3): 595–612
- John A. Henderson, Jasjeet S. Sekhon, and Rocío Titiunik. 2016. “Cause or Effect? Turnout in Hispanic Majority-Minority Districts.” *Political Analysis* 24:404–412

March 26: NO CLASS (Spring Break)

7 April 2: Substantive Representation

Required readings (133 pages):

- [PDF](#) Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” *American Political Science Review* 57 (1): 45–56

- [PDF](#) Christopher H. Achen. 1978. “Measuring Representation.” *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (3): 475–510
- [PDF](#) Brandice Canes-Wrone. 2015. “From Mass Preferences to Policy.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (1): 147–165
- [PDF](#) David E. Broockman. 2016. “Approaches to Studying Policy Representation.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 41 (1): 181–215
- [PDF](#) Mia Costa, Kaylee T. Johnson, and Brian F. Schaffner. 2017. “Rethinking Representation from a Communal Perspective.” *Political Behavior* 40 (2): 301–320

Recommended readings:

- [PDF](#) Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karps. 1977. “The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2 (3): 233–254
- [PDF](#) Robert Weissberg. 1978. “Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress.” *American Political Science Review* 72 (2): 535–547
- [PDF](#) Robert Y. Shapiro. 2011. “Public Opinion and American Democracy.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 75 (5): 982–1017

8 April 9: Responsiveness

Required readings (166 pages):

- [PDF](#) Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. 1989. “Political Parties, Public Opinion, and State Policy in the United States.” *American Political Science Review* 83 (3): 729–750
- [PDF](#) James A. Stimson. 1999. “Party Government and Responsiveness.” In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan Carol Stokes, and Bernard Manin, 197–221. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Soroka and Wlezien, *Degrees of Democracy*, pp. 22–42 (“The Thermostatic Model”), 43–62 (“Adding Issues and Institutions”), and 125–44 (“Policy Representation”)
- Devin Caughey. 2018. *The Unsolid South: Mass Politics and National Representation in a One-Party Enclave*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 142–171 (chapter 6)

- [PDF](#) Devin Caughey and Christopher Warshaw. 2018. “Policy Preferences and Policy Change: Dynamic Responsiveness in the American States, 1936–2014.” *American Political Science Review* 112 (2): 249–266. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000533>

Recommended readings:

- Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. 1993. *Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. “Dynamic Representation.” *American Political Science Review* 89 (3): 543–565
- Robert S. Erikson, Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson. 2002. *The Macro Polity*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Joshua D. Clinton. 2006. “Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th House.” *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 397–409
- Julianna Pacheco. 2013. “The Thermostatic Model of Responsiveness in the American States.” *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 13 (3): 306–332
- Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw. 2014. “Representation in Municipal Government.” *American Political Science Review* 108 (3): 605–641

April 16: NO CLASS (Patriot’s Day)

9 April 23: Congruence

Required readings (118 pages):

Methodological critique of responsiveness:

- [PDF](#) John G. Matsusaka. 2001. “Problems with a Methodology Used to Evaluate the Voter Initiative.” *Journal of Politics* 63 (4): 1250–1256
- [PDF](#) Michael G. Hagen, Edward L. Lascher Jr., and John F. Camobreco. 2001. “Response to Matsusaka: Estimating the Effect of Ballot Initiatives on Policy Responsiveness.” *Journal of Politics* 63 (4): 1257–1263

Ideological congruence:

- [PDF](#) Joseph Bafumi and Michael C. Herron. 2010. “Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress.” *American Political Science Review* 104 (3): 519–542
- [PDF](#) Stephen A. Jessee. 2016. “(How) Can We Estimate the Ideology of Citizens and Political Elites on the Same Scale?” *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (4): 1108–1124

Policy-specific congruence:

- [PDF](#) Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips. 2012. “The Democratic Deficit in the States.” *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (1): 148–166
- [PDF](#) Gabor Simonovits, Andrew M. Guess, and Jonathan Nagler. 2018. “Responsiveness without Representation: Evidence from Minimum Wage Laws in U.S. States.” *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (3): 1–10
- [PDF](#) Douglas J. Ahler and David E. Broockman. 2018. “The Delegate Paradox: Why Polarized Politicians Can Represent Citizens Best.” *Journal of Politics* 80 (4): 1117–1133
- Additional 11-page reading to be handed out in class

10 April 30: Political and Policy Feedback

Required readings (197 pages):

- [PDF](#) Richard F. Fenno Jr. 1977. “U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration.” *American Political Science Review* 71 (3): 883–917
- [PDF](#) Claudine Gay. 2002. “Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Relationship Between Citizens and Their Government.” *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (4): 717–733
- [PDF](#) David R. Mayhew. 2005. “Actions in the Public Sphere.” Chap. 3 in *The Legislative Branch*, edited by Paul J. Quirk and Sarah A. Binder, 63–108. Institutions of American Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press
- [PDF](#) Andrea Louise Campbell. 2012. “Policy Makes Mass Politics.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (1): 333–351
- Soroka and Wlezien, *Degrees of Democracy*, pp. 88–106 (“Parameters of Public Responsiveness”), 107–124 (“Public Responsiveness Explored”), and 145–167 (“Disaggregating Public Responsiveness and Policy Representation”)

Recommended readings

- Andrea Louise Campbell. 2003. *How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the American Welfare State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Joe Soss and Sanford F. Schram. 2007. “A Public Transformed? Welfare Reform as Policy Feedback.” *American Political Science Review* 101 (1): 111–127
- Paul Pierson. 1993. “When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change.” *World Politics* 45 (4): 595–628
- Suzanne Mettler. 2002. “Bringing the State Back In to Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans.” *American Political Science Review* 96 (2): 351–365
- Vesla M. Weaver and Amy Lerman. 2010. “Political Consequences of the Carceral State.” *American Political Science Review* 104 (4): 817–833
- Joshua D. Clinton and Michael W. Sances. 2018. “The Politics of Policy: The Initial Mass Political Effects of Medicaid Expansion in the States.” *American Political Science Review* 112 (1): 167–185

11 May 7: Bias and Inequality

Required readings (162 pages):

- [PDF](#) Elizabeth Rigby and Gerald C. Wright. 2011. “Whose Statehouse Democracy: Policy Responsiveness to Poor Versus Rich Constituents in Poor Versus Rich States.” Chap. 7 in *Who Gets Represented?*, edited by Peter K. Enns and Christopher Wlezien, 189–222. New York: Russell Sage Foundation
- [PDF](#) Martin Gilens. 2011. “Policy Consequences of Representational Inequality.” Chap. 9 in *Who Gets Represented?*, edited by Peter K. Enns and Christopher Wlezien, 247–284. New York: Russell Sage Foundation
- [PDF](#) Elizabeth U. Cascio and Ebonya Washington. 2014. “Valuing the Vote: The Redistribution of Voting Rights and State Funds Following the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129 (1): 379–433
- [PDF](#) Jessica Trounstine. 2016. “Segregation and Inequality in Public Goods.” *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (3): 709–725

- [PDF](#) Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Matto Mildemberger, and Leah C. Stokes. 2018. “Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress.” *American Political Science Review*: 1–18. Pre-published. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000606>

Recommended Readings:

- [PDF](#) Larry M. Bartels. 2016. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 233–68 (chapter 8)
- [PDF](#) James A. Stimson. 2009. “Perspectives on Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age.” *Perspectives on Politics* 7 (1): 151–153

12 May 14: Institutions and Reforms

Required readings (192 pages):

Elections:

- [PDF](#) Sanford C. Gordon and Gregory A. Huber. 2007. “The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 2 (2): 107–138

Media:

- [PDF](#) James M. Snyder Jr. and David Strömberg. 2010. “Press Coverage and Political Accountability.” *Journal of Political Economy* 118 (2): 355–408

Term length:

- [PDF](#) Rocío Titiunik. 2015. “Drawing Your Senator from a Jar: Term Length and Legislative Behavior.” *Political Science Research and Methods* 4 (2): 293–316

Campaign finance:

- [PDF](#) Andrew B. Hall. 2016. “Systemic Effects of Campaign Spending: Evidence from Corporate Contribution Bans in US State Legislatures.” *Political Science Research and Methods* 4 (2): 343–359

Direct democracy:

- [PDF](#) John G. Matsusaka. 2018. “Public Policy and the Initiative and Referendum: A Survey with Some New Evidence.” *Public Choice* 174 (1): 107–143

Districting

- [PDF](#) Carolyn Abbott and Asya Magazinnik. 2019. “At-Large Elections Revisited: The Contingent and Causal Effects of Reform on Local Minority Representation.” Unpublished manuscript (43 pages), January 9. <https://www.dropbox.com/s/dkqnk37z6qv6hg2/main.pdf?dl=0>

Recommended Readings:

- [PDF](#) Elizabeth R. Gerber. 1996. “Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives.” *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (1): 99–128
- [PDF](#) Stephen Ansolabehere, Alan Gerber, and Jim Snyder. 2002. “Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States.” *American Political Science Review* 96 (4): 767–777
- [PDF](#) Grant Miller. 2008. “Women’s Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123 (3): 1287–1327
- [PDF](#) Anthony Fowler. 2013. “Electoral and Policy Consequences of Voter Turnout: Evidence from Compulsory Voting in Australia.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8 (2): 159–182
- [PDF](#) Devin Caughey, Chris Tausanovitch, and Christopher Warshaw. 2017. “Partisan Gerrymandering and the Political Process: Effects on Roll-Call Voting and State Policies.” *Election Law Journal* 16 (4): 453–469. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/e1j.2017.0452>

This syllabus was last modified on February 20, 2019.