HONOR AND WAR
Southern US Presidents and the Effects of Concern for Reputation

By ALLAN DAFOE and DEVIN CAUGHEY*

> Submission, whether as regards individuals or nations, provokes insult and aggression.
> —*Mississippi's* Yazoo Democrat, *on the US–Mexican War, 1848***

INTRODUCTION

DO countries go to war for reputation? Specifically, does concern for reputation for resolve[1] cause national leaders to escalate military conflicts they would otherwise settle peacefully? The logic for doing so is straightforward and familiar. A state's behavior in one dispute (yielding to Hitler's demands at Munich, for example) leads potential adversaries and allies to make inferences about its likely behavior in future disputes (further appeasement). In anticipation of reputational consequences, states alter their behavior, standing firm in disputes they might otherwise concede.

Such a reputational logic has been used to explain the origins and escalation of conflicts from the Peloponnesian War to the Vietnam War,[2]

** Quoted in Hospodor 1999, 6. The commas have been added for grammatical clarity.
[1] In this article we sometimes use reputation as shorthand for reputation for resolve.
[2] See, for example, Kagan 1995; Lebow 2010.

doi: 10.1017/S0043887115000416

and yet, just how important reputational concerns are as causes of war remains uncertain. To be sure, the public justifications and recollections of key decision makers often invoke reputation. Given leaders' strategic and self-serving reasons to mask their true beliefs, however, scholars cannot necessarily take their statements at face value. Even when strategic misrepresentation is not a concern, interpreting actors' motivations is still a "necessarily subjective and debatable" process that cannot be fully separated from scholars' own theoretical expectations and commitments.[3]

Quantitative analysis offers the possibility of greater objectivity, but faces challenges of its own. One is the presumed ubiquity of reputational considerations. Without observable variation in concern for reputation, we cannot infer its effects. To the extent that concern for reputation does vary, it is difficult to disentangle from other attributes that influence conflict behavior, such as military capabilities and geographic location. Even worse, "state leaders have incentives to confound our inferences" by anticipating the outcome of disputes, requiring scholars to theorize carefully about selection effects and the specific observable implications of concern for reputation.[4]

Our strategy for overcoming these challenges is to exploit within-country variation in national leaders' concern for reputation for resolve. Specifically, we compare the conflict behavior of the United States when led by presidents raised in the American South, whose "culture of honor" valorizes reputation for resolve,[5] with its behavior when led by a non-Southerner. While honor in general and the South's culture of honor in particular are complex cultural phenomena, at their core lies a profound emphasis on reputation for resolve. As a consequence of their cultural socialization, white Southerners tend to be more concerned with reputation for resolve than non-Southerners. This concern has pervasively shaped Southern presidents' approach to interstate conflict. It has made Southerners more averse than non-Southerners to backing down once the United States is visibly committed to an interstate dispute, and consequently made them more likely to use military force, resist withdrawal, and ultimately achieve victory.

We marshal three main kinds of evidence in support of this argument. First, building on the wide-ranging literature in history and psychology on the South's culture of honor, we provide extensive evidence for white Southerners' unusually intense concern with reputation for

---

[3] Jervis 2012, 341.
[4] Quote from Schultz 2001b, 33, in the context of audience costs. See also Fearon 2002.
[5] Nisbett and Cohen 1996.

resolve. This scholarship shows that these cultural differences between regions have deep roots and persist today, and that they have led Southerners to adopt a distinctive orientation toward interpersonal as well as interstate conflict.

Second, to illustrate how our argument applies to the United States' actual behavior in interstate disputes, we contrast the presidency of John Kennedy, a non-Southerner, with that of his successor, Lyndon Johnson, a Southerner. This paired comparison suggests that although Kennedy, along with the rest of the US foreign policy establishment of that era, cared about reputation for resolve, Johnson cared even more, leading to predictable differences in their approaches to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, and other disputes. Despite the structural similarities between their presidencies, Johnson was more averse than Kennedy to conceding or withdrawing from disputes with other nations, and more willing to escalate to higher levels of military force.

Third, we generalize the Kennedy-Johnson comparison with a comprehensive analysis of US conflict behavior under Southern and non-Southern presidents over the past two centuries. We show that US militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) that have occurred under Southern presidents have been twice as likely to involve the use of force, have lasted on average twice as long, and have been three times as likely to be won by the United States. These differences are robust to matching presidencies on potential confounders and are unlikely to be the result of selection effects or of Southern presidents' other attributes.

Taken together, this evidence corroborates the view that concern for reputation exerts powerful effects on international relations. It suggests that the greater importance leaders attach to others' beliefs about their state's resolve, the more willing they are to escalate military disputes rather than to concede them. As a consequence, leaders who are more concerned with reputation are more likely to win conflicts outright, but at the cost of longer disputes and more frequent uses of force. Given that even non-Southern presidents care about reputation, too, the full effects of concern for reputation for resolve are probably even greater than the large differences we estimate.

REPUTATION AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT

Reputation for resolve, along with related social motives such as honor, glory, prestige, status, and respect, has long been considered an important cause of interstate conflict. Thucydides, for example, includes honor with fear and self-interest among the most powerful motives for

war.[6] Similarly, Thomas Hobbes identifies "glory," which "maketh men invade . . . for reputation," as one of the "principall causes of quarrel."[7] Hans Morgenthau argues that a nation's "prestige—its reputation for power—is . . . an indispensable element of a rational foreign policy," and Thomas Schelling calls "reputation for action . . . one of the few things worth fighting over."[8] Although these various motives differ in important ways, all depend crucially on reputation for resolve. A leader or state that permits its reputation for resolve to come into question risks losing honor, status, prestige, glory, and respect in the eyes of others.

Reputation for resolve has also figured prominently in the private calculations and public rhetoric of US foreign policy makers. The United States' very first overseas military expedition, dispatched by President Thomas Jefferson in retaliation for the Barbary pirates' attacks on American merchants, followed a clear reputational logic.[9] Such depredations "must be resented," Jefferson explained, in order "to prevent their eternal repetition. . . . Weakness provokes insult & injury, [and] an insult unpunished is the parent of many others."[10] Subsequent presidents justified their own military interventions in similar terms. Responding to German provocations on the eve of American entry into World War I, Woodrow Wilson announced, "We covet peace and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. . . . Once accept a single abatement of right, and many other humiliations would certainly follow."[11] Five decades later, Lyndon Johnson declared, "Our national honor is at stake in Southeast Asia, and we are going to protect it."[12] And in 2004, referencing the United States' invasion of Iraq, George W. Bush concluded, "For diplomacy to be effective, words must be credible. And no one can now doubt the word of America."[13]

Is such reputational rhetoric merely window dressing intended for public consumption? Or does concern for reputation actually affect how US presidents and other leaders act on the international stage? Many scholars have argued that concern for reputation is a prominent motive for war,[14] but systematic quantitative evidence has been elusive,

---

[6] Thucydides 1972, sec. 1.76; see also Kagan 1995, 8.

[7] Hobbes [1651] 1985, 185.

[8] Morgenthau 1948, 93; Schelling 1966, 124.

[9] Herring 2008, 98–99.

[10] These quotations are from an earlier letter to John Jay, in which Jefferson explains his general thoughts on protecting American commerce; see Jefferson 1785.

[11] Wilson 1916.

[12] Quoted in Wyatt-Brown 2005, 441–42.

[13] Bush 2004.

[14] Jervis 1970; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Jervis and Snyder 1991; Kagan 1995; Mercer 1996; Huth 1997; Markey 1999; Tang 2005; Press 2005; Lebow 2008; Lebow 2010.

due largely to the difficulty of finding observable variation in concern for reputation. Recently, however, a number of studies have exploited variation across strategic situations to examine the relationship between states' concern for reputation and their actual conflict behavior. This research has shown that states are more belligerent and resolved when reputation is particularly salient, for example when they face many potential separatist groups,[15] are currently involved in other disputes,[16] or are targeted by a neighboring, powerful, or historically aggressive state.[17]

Some scholars, enticed by "the potential to demonstrate causality in a way that other methods do not," have turned instead to randomized experiments as means of studying reputation.[18] Dustin Tingley and Barbara Walter, for example, use laboratory experiments to show that players in an entry-deterrence game tend to invest in building reputations for toughness, and that such reputations benefit those who hold them.[19] Other scholars use scenario-based survey experiments to study the reputational bases of public approval of leader behavior. These studies have uncovered evidence that citizens disapprove when their leaders behave contrary to their public commitments and that citizens' disapproval is mediated by concern for reputation,[20] which is consistent with James Fearon's claim that concern for "international loss of credibility, face, or honor" underlies domestic audience costs.[21]

Historical case studies, large-N cross-national analyses, and randomized experiments have enriched our understanding of the role that concern for reputation, particularly reputation for resolve, plays in international relations. Absent from the literature, however, are studies that exploit a plausibly "as if random" manipulation of national leaders' concern for reputation for resolve. Such natural experiments are valuable because they often yield more credible causal inferences than other kinds of observational studies and provide greater real-world validity than laboratory and survey experiments.[22] The American South's

---

[15] Walter 2006; Walter 2009.

[16] Wiegand 2011.

[17] Sechser 2007; Sechser 2013. In a related enterprise, Stein 2015 finds that democracies with more vengeful populations are more likely to initiate interstate conflicts than those with less vengeful populations, as proxied by retention of the death penalty.

[18] Hyde 2010, 74.

[19] Tingley and Walter 2011b.

[20] Tomz 2007, 835; Brutger and Kertzer 2015; Levy et al. 2015, 11.

[21] Fearon 1994, 581.

[22] Sekhon and Titiunik 2012 define a natural experiment as "a study in which the assignment of treatments to subjects is haphazard and possibly random." For a similar definition in terms of "as if" random assignment, see Dunning 2012. For a different perspective emphasizing the importance of intervention or manipulation, see Robinson, McNulty, and Krasno 2009.

culture of honor, which particularly valorizes reputation for resolve, provides the basis for such a natural experiment. Historical alternation between Southern and non-Southern US presidents generates sharp, transparent, and haphazard variation in the weight that the nation's most important decision maker places on reputation for resolve. Careful comparison of US conflict behavior under Southern and non-Southern presidents thus provides unique insight into the causal effects of concern for reputation for resolve.

Reputation, Resolve, and Honor

We begin this section by defining several important concepts and clarifying the theoretical relationships between them. Our focus is the effects of *concern for reputation for resolve*. An actor's *reputation* consists of others' beliefs, informed by the actor's past actions, about an actor's behavioral propensities. *Resolve* is an actor's willingness to stand firm in a particular dispute or class of disputes. Since resolve is a function of situation-specific factors as well as enduring ones, *reputation for resolve* is best defined as others' beliefs about the persistent determinants of the actor's resolve for a given class of disputes.[23] Among the most important determinants of actors' resolve are their own beliefs about the importance of being perceived by others as resolved—that is, their concern for reputation for resolve. The more concerned actors are with appearing resolved, the more they will in fact act resolved.

To identify the effects of presidents' concern for reputation for resolve, our study exploits variation in the cultural importance of honor. Honor, the "most elusive of social concepts," is a highly complex phenomenon whose meaning depends greatly on context.[24] It has both an internal aspect—the possession of certain virtues that entitle one to honor—and an external aspect—the social status or right to respect granted and recognized by society. Honor is thus at once "a sentiment, a manifestation of this sentiment in conduct, and the evaluation of this conduct by others, that is to say, reputation."[25]

The importance of honor varies greatly across social contexts; societies where honor is particularly important are referred to as "cultures of honor." Examples of such cultures range from Mediterranean villages and Scotch-Irish herders to Southern US aristocrats and the criminal

---

[23] Huth 1997, 82; see also Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014.

[24] Quote from Patterson 1985, 80.

[25] Pitt-Rivers 1968, 503. For further discussion of internal and external honor, see Stewart 1994, 21–25.

underworld.[26] Across these contexts, the specific meaning of honor differs on several dimensions. In some, honor is understood dichotomously, as something one either has or lacks. In others, honor resembles glory or respect in that individuals can have more or less of it.[27] The specific qualities that entitle one to honor differ as well; examples of honorable virtues include toughness, honesty, loyalty, and chastity. The set of behaviors required to maintain honor varies, too, with some cultures prescribing highly formalized codes of conduct. Travelers in the antebellum South, for example, were advised to take care to understand the nuances of local honor codes, for what was understood as appropriate conversation in one area could be perceived as a grievous insult in another.[28]

This diversity notwithstanding, a core component of all honor cultures is that one does not have honor unless others believe one does. Further, an honorable individual is expected to care intensely about being seen as honorable.[29] For men,[30] this requires a willingness to violently resist predations, provocations, insults, and other challenges to their honor, as well as a reputation for being willing to do so.[31] Thus, concern for one's reputation for resolve—that is, for standing firm in disputes over important issues—is a necessary component of honor. Moreover, because concern for reputation for resolve is a quality required for honor, any challenge to one's reputation for being so concerned is a challenge to honor itself.

Being concerned for reputation for resolve does not imply a willingness to fight over anything and everything. Fighting is required only when reputation for resolve is at stake—that is, when an actor's choices influence how resolved others expect the actor to be in the future. When is reputation for resolve at stake? The answer depends greatly on the

[26] Peristiany 1966; Nisbett and Cohen 1996; Wyatt-Brown 1982; Jacobs and Wright 2006; Bowman 2007. Many scholars have noted that honor tends to be most prominent in settings where possessions are easily expropriated, political authority is weak, and reputations are well known, such as rural herding societies; see, for example, Campbell 1964; McElreath 2003.

[27] Honor is often distinguished from fame or glory in that the former is available to (indeed, expected of) all honor-eligible individuals. "Honor," writes Schopenhauer, "means that a man is not exceptional; fame, that he is"; Schopenhauer 2004, sec. 4.

[28] Williams 2000, 23; Miller 2005.

[29] In a culture of honor, "the being and truth about a person are identical with the being and truth that others acknowledge in him"; Bourdieu 1966, 212. See also Pitt-Rivers 1968, 503; Stewart 1994, 12–13.

[30] In nearly all cultures honor is a highly gendered construct: the virtues entitling a person to honor and the behaviors required to maintain honor differ radically between men and women. In the Old South specifically, "only adult white males had the right to honor"; Ayers 1984, 13. We focus on masculine honor as it involves heightened concern for reputation for resolve and, so far, all US presidents have been male.

[31] Cooney 2013; O'Neill 1999, 87–92.

symbolic language of the specific context and the psychology of the disputants involved. This context-dependence stems from the logical circularity that reputation for resolve is at stake wherever people think it is. Consequently, any issue, no matter how trivial, can become a test of resolve. This can lead to fights over seeming trifles, such as a tweak of another man's nose (a grave insult in the antebellum South)[32] or the shape of a negotiating table (which held up the 1969 Vietnam War peace talks for months).[33]

That said, reputation for resolve is most likely to be implicated when important interests are at stake and the risk of violence is high. Examples of reputation-engaging events in international relations include public commitments (for example, when President Kennedy said the US would not tolerate offensive missiles in Cuba) and insulting demands from other actors, such as a demand for tribute. While future research should seek to identify such events more systematically, given the current paucity of data on the subject, we must rely on a readily available proxy for reputation engagement. A promising one is the militarization of a dispute. As Fearon notes, "leaders and publics have typically understood threats and troop deployments to 'engage the national honor.'"[34] We therefore adopt the following simple, but we believe reasonable, assumption that undergirds the statistical analyses later in the paper:

>   —Assumption 1: The militarization of a dispute, that is, the first threat, show, or use of military force, indicates that reputation for resolve is at stake.

Assumption 1 implies that the behavioral consequences of differential concern for reputation for resolve should be evident in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), where reputation for resolve is often at stake. But it is worth noting that this assumption, and implied proxy, is not perfect. First, whereas reputation can plausibly be more or less at stake, we simplify the concept and the measure into a dichotomy of being at stake or not. Second, there are some militarized disputes where reputation and honor do not appear to be at stake and some nonmilitarized disputes where they are. Nevertheless, until there are better measures of when reputation is at stake, we believe MIDs serve as a useful proxy.[35]

---

[32] Greenberg 1990.

[33] Kissinger 1994, 684; O'Neill 1999, 61.

[34] Fearon 1994, 580. Threats and other militarized actions have also been shown to substantially increase the reputation-motivated domestic audience costs to backing down in an interstate dispute; Tomz 2007.

[35] Recent work has questioned MIDs' appropriateness for studying domestic audience costs, defined as domestic punishment for backing down from a threat, since few MIDs involve explicit threats; see

OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS OF CONCERN FOR
REPUTATION FOR RESOLVE

What behavioral consequences should we expect when reputation is at stake? Answering this question is complicated by actors' strategic anticipation of the outcome of disputes.[36] Any credible analysis of the effects of concern for reputation for resolve must therefore account for its effects on nations' decisions to select into disputes in the first place. To think through these selection effects and other strategic complications, we found it helpful to rely on game-theoretic models of conflict escalation with reputation costs.[37] Below we provide an informal discussion of the observable implications that emerge from the models.[38]

An intuition that often arises is that greater concern for reputation leads to greater belligerence and hawkishness in general. To be sure, many honor cultures, such as the Old South or the Vikings, appear to be relatively violent societies. But our formal models of selection into disputes reveal that this prediction does not necessarily follow.[39] The direct effect of increasing an agent's concern for reputation for resolve is to make that agent more resolved *when reputation is at stake*. This increases the expected costs to others of putting the agent's reputation at stake, and thus deters some challengers. There will then be two additional countervailing effects on the agent: (1) the agent will be emboldened to escalate conflicts (in a way that puts reputation at stake) knowing that others will be more likely to be intimidated; and (2) the agent will be more cautious about bluffing (escalating conflicts in a way that puts reputation at stake when the agent isn't willing to escalate all the way), because the costs of a called bluff are greater. We see this greater caution in the strong Southern norms around politeness, which are prudent in a world where rudeness is more likely to lead to fatal violence.[40] In our models, we find that concern for reputation's effect on the

---

Downes and Sechser 2012. However, if audience costs are more broadly defined as the domestic costs of backing down after reputation is at stake, then assumption 1 implies that MIDs are in fact useful for studying domestic audience costs as well as concern for reputation; see Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014, 387; see also Fearon 1994.

[36] Cf. Schultz 2001b; Fearon 2002.

[37] More specifically, the model is a two-player sequential game of chicken under incomplete information, with three escalation levels and weakly increasing costs of conflict. Concern for reputation for resolve is parameterized as a cost to backing down, which is weakly increasing in the level of escalation. Our operationalization of reputation concerns is similar to the typical formalization of domestic audience costs, which makes sense since domestic audience costs are conceptualized as being motivated by concern for international reputation; see, for example, Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001a; Slantchev 2011; Trager and Vavreck 2011.

[38] For more details, see Dafoe and Caughey 2015.

[39] For a similar result from the perspective of evolutionary stable equilibria, see McElreath 2003.

[40] Cohen et al. 1999.

frequency of MIDs depends on the shape of the probability distribution of costs for fighting. Since we do not have a reasonable basis for choosing certain probability distributions over others, we cannot derive clear predictions about the effect of concern for reputation on the frequency of militarized disputes, or on any outcome that is not conditioned on reputation being at stake.

We can, however, derive more confident predictions for disputes in which reputation is at stake, which are largely robust to different type distributions and strategic selection. Our first prediction emerges unambiguously under all four of the models and type distributions that we consider:

> —H1. Leaders who care more about reputation for resolve will be more likely to use military force in militarized disputes.

This prediction is strong because the indirect effects run in the same direction as the direct effect. The direct effect is that leaders who care more about reputation will be less willing to back down (to not use force) once reputation is at stake. Knowing this, reputation-concerned leaders will be less likely to bluff with their reputation, so only more resolved reputation-concerned leaders will choose to engage their reputation, reinforcing the direct effect.

We next consider the effect on the duration of disputes. In our models we operationalize duration as increasing in the level of escalation of the conflict. We find that increasing concern for reputation leads to longer disputes in three of the four models; in the fourth, the comparative statics are ambiguous. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. A reputation-concerned leader will be more likely to stand firm, which makes that leader more likely to prolong a dispute. The reason this prediction does not hold unambiguously for all four models is that concern for reputation also has an intimidation effect that can make an adversary back down sooner than would otherwise occur. When this intimidation effect dominates, disputes can become shorter. Nevertheless, since disputes become unambiguously longer in three of the four models and for reasonable parameter values in the fourth model, we state our second prediction:

> —H2. Leaders who care more about reputation for resolve will experience longer militarized disputes.

Last, we consider the effect of concern for reputation on the outcome of disputes. We operationalize victory as occurring when the opponent concedes, and a loss as occurring when the focal agent concedes. We

find in most models that greater concern for reputation leads to more victories and fewer losses. The intuition is again straightforward. A reputation-concerned agent is less likely to back down and more likely to intimidate the opponent into backing down. One ambiguity again arises from selection effects: for some type distributions, it is the case that the only adversaries who choose to put reputation at stake against a reputation-concerned leader are those who have exceptionally high resolve. And again, for reasonable parameter values, this counterprediction does not hold.

—H3. Leaders who care more about reputation for resolve are more likely to win and less likely to lose their disputes.

Southern Honor and Foreign Affairs

Before empirically testing the hypotheses derived in the section above, we provide evidence for our claim that because they were raised in a culture of honor, Southern presidents have been more concerned than non-Southern presidents with maintaining a reputation for resolve in international relations. Honor has long been recognized as one of the ordering principles of Southern society, with "tremendous importance [for] regulating and determining the conduct of the individual."[41] An ethic of honor was prominent among both of the groups that most influenced Southern white culture, the English Cavaliers and the Scotch-Irish,[42] as well as among Southern whites in all subregions and classes.[43] By contrast, "honor never sank deep roots" in the non-Southern United States.[44] Indeed, by the mid-1800s the North "had generated the core of a culture antagonistic to honor" emphasizing restraint, discipline, and self-control, which one scholar labels a "culture of dignity."[45]

From the perspective of cultural psychology, the Southern culture of honor can be thought of as a sociocultural model or tool kit—a set of "blueprints for how to think, feel, and act."[46] Transmitted from

[41] Franklin 1970, 34.
[42] Ayers 1989; Fischer 1989; McWhiney 1988, 169–70; James 1986.
[43] Franklin 1970, 33–37; Wyatt-Brown 1982, 355–56.
[44] Ayers 1989, 1483; see also Krause 2002, 97–131.
[45] Ayers 1984, 19–20. Even before honor died out in the North, it was understood differently than in the South; non-Southerners tended to conceive of honor in terms of Christian virtue and were less liable to resort to violence in its defense, see Fischer 1989, 188, 582–3; Freeman 2001, 168. One Northern soldier stationed in the South after the Civil War marveled at the South's "pugnacity," noting that it "permeates all society; it has infected all individualities. The meekest man by nature, the man who at the North would no more fight than he would jump out of a second story window, may at the South resent an insult by a blow, or perhaps a stab or pistol shot"; Ayers 1984, 10.
[46] Markus and Hamedani 2007, 15–18.

generation to generation through the process of socialization, the be-
liefs, values, and behaviors of the culture of honor have persisted long
after the original reasons for them faded away.[47] Opinion surveys have
found that to this day white Southerners remain more likely than white
non-Southerners to endorse violence when honor is implicated, but not
otherwise.[48] Laboratory experiments have found that Southern men
respond to insults with greater distress and aggression than do non-
Southerners, and are more likely to believe that insults "damaged their
masculine reputation or status."[49] Thus although the culture of honor
may have been even stronger in the past, contemporary Southerners are
more likely than non-Southerners to respond forcefully to challenges
to their honor.

Southerners' distinctive approach to interpersonal conflict is also
reflected in their attitudes toward interstate conflict. The most com-
prehensive historical survey of the South and foreign affairs identifies
honor as one of the fundamental principles structuring the region's ori-
entation toward the rest of the world.[50] This ethic of honor, observes
another historian, has led Southerners to follow a distinctive interna-
tional code of conduct characterized by an intense concern with the
nation's status in the world and "a compulsion for revenge when, in both
personal and collective terms, repute for one or another virtue is repu-
diated."[51] Various scholars have identified honor as a powerful shaper
of Southern attitudes toward such episodes as the War of 1812,[52] the
acquisition of Florida,[53] the US-Mexican War,[54] the Civil War,[55] inter-
ventions in Latin America,[56] and the major conflicts of the twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries.[57]

The influence of honor and concern for reputation is also evident in
Southern public opinion, as is documented in Alfred Hero's voluminous
The Southerner and World Affairs. Hero reports that white Southern sur-
vey respondents attribute higher probability to the outbreak of conflict
than non-Southern respondents do, and are more likely to tolerate the
escalation of limited conflicts into general wars. They are more likely

[47] Vandello, Cohen, and Ransom 2008.
[48] Cohen and Nisbett 1994.
[49] Cohen et al. 1996, 957; Nisbett and Cohen 1996, 41–55.
[50] Fry 2002. Compare with the "Jacksonian tradition" discussed by Mead 2002.
[51] Wyatt-Brown 2005, 433.
[52] Risjord 1961.
[53] Stevenson 2004.
[54] Hospodor 1999.
[55] Cooper 1983, 180–81.
[56] Quirk 1967.
[57] Fischer 1989, 843; Wyatt-Brown 2005.

to consider deterrence based on military might the most reliable way to prevent aggression. And if war does break out, they tend to believe that "we should fight to 'lick' our opponents" so that others "will know what to expect from [the United States] and act accordingly"—a clear expression of concern for reputation for resolve.[58]

Like the culture of honor generally, the South's distinctive approach to international relations persists to this day. White Southerners express greater favorability toward the military than whites elsewhere in the US, and they are more likely to believe that the Iraq War was "worth the cost" and effective at deterring terrorists.[59] Further evidence is provided by Michael Tomz's survey experiment of domestic audience costs, which we reanalyzed for regional differences.[60] Under this study's control condition, in which the president does not prevent an act of aggression and had not made any commitments to do so, Southern and non-Southern white males expressed similar levels of disapproval (29 percent and 31 percent, respectively). Consistent with the logic of honor, however, Southern disapproval increases by 25 percentage points when the president threatens to "push out the invaders"—thus engaging their reputation—but then fails to act, compared to a 14-point increase in disapproval among non-Southerners.[61]

In sum, historical, psychological, and survey evidence suggests that the culture of honor is a real and enduring phenomenon that shapes Southerners' attitudes and behavior regarding both interpersonal and interstate conflict. The central theme of Southern distinctiveness in violent conflict is an aversion to backing down once one's honor is at stake. The question is whether the consequences of Southerners' heightened concern for reputation for resolve translates into real differences in US conflict behavior when a Southerner is president.

Kennedy and Johnson: A Paired Comparison

How does concern for reputation influence the actual behavior of the United States in international disputes? As a first cut at answering this question, we compare the conflict behavior of two presidents, Kennedy and Johnson, who faced similar (and sometimes identical) foreign policy situations. No case study can hold all confounding factors constant; indeed, this is the rationale for our subsequent statistical analyses

---

[58] Hero 1965, 81–86, 111–26.
[59] American National Election Studies 2008; see also Golby and Stein 2011.
[60] Tomz 2007.
[61] The one-sided permutation p-value of the difference in differences is 0.056.

that compare average differences between Southern and non-Southern presidents across many disputes. Nevertheless, a comparison of two structurally similar cases can illuminate the causal effects of differences between them, particularly if close attention is paid to causal mechanisms.[62]

Kennedy, after defeating Johnson for the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination, chose Johnson as his running mate for the general election. President Kennedy served from January 1961 until his assassination in November 1963 and was succeeded by Johnson, who occupied the presidency until 1969. Due to their temporal proximity and the unexpected timing of Johnson's accession, the presidencies of these two men had many structural attributes in common. They faced a very similar geopolitical environment, one dominated by global rivalry with the Soviet Union. Both presidents, along with their foreign policy advisors, who overlapped substantially across administrations, accepted the basic strategic premises of containment and the importance of maintaining American "credibility" in the eyes of other nations.[63] Both were veterans of the Second World War, though Kennedy's combat record was more distinguished. Finally, as fellow Democrats, Kennedy and Johnson faced similar domestic political incentives to avoid being labeled soft on communism while also averting large-scale commitments of US troops.[64]

What observable differences between Kennedy and Johnson does our theory predict? First, we should expect Johnson, having been socialized in the culturally Southern state of Texas, to express greater concern for reputation for resolve than Kennedy, who was raised in Massachusetts. Second, Johnson should evince greater aversion to backing down once the United States visibly committed to an interstate dispute. Thus Johnson, once committed, should be more apt to escalate a dispute to higher levels of force and less willing to concede the issue or withdraw unilaterally. More tentatively, we should expect that the anticipation of the costs of backing down should increase Johnson's wariness about US involvement in disputes in the first place.

Bertram Wyatt-Brown argues that Johnson epitomized the South's honor-focused approach to international affairs and that even before his presidency, "concern for reputation had always figured in his

[62] George and Bennett 2005. Saunders 2009 and Saunders 2011 make a similar argument to justify her comparison of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, which focuses on their different beliefs about the relative importance of internal and external threats.

[63] Herring 2008, 702–59; Costigliola 2010.

[64] Freedman 2000, 404; Caverley 2010.

calculations."[65] As president, Johnson was highly concerned with his and the nation's reputation for strength and resolve. "His principal foreign policy concern," writes George Herring, "was to avoid anything that smacked of weakness or defeat."[66] The metaphors Johnson used to describe international relations were redolent of the culture of honor. "If you let a bully come into your yard one day," Johnson told Doris Kearns, "the next day he'll be up on your porch and the day after that he'll rape your wife in your own bed."[67] For Johnson, personal and national reputation were inextricably linked; he saw the Vietnam War in particular "as a test of his own manliness."[68] A defeat under his watch, he feared, would not only embolden America's adversaries, but also tar him as, in his words, "a coward. An unmanly man. A man without a spine."[69]

Kennedy, too, along with the rest of the American foreign policy establishment, was concerned about US reputation for resolve, and like Johnson he worried also about his personal reputation for weakness or strength.[70] Yet there is little evidence that Kennedy was as intensely and personally concerned with reputation for resolve as Johnson was.[71] Even Kennedy's preference for the term "credibility" over Johnson's "honor" signified a more calculated, rationalistic view of reputation. Abandoning commitments had costs, to be sure, but sometimes the benefits outweighed them—hence Kennedy's willingness in 1961 to walk away from the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and to back down from his public commitment to resist communist advances in Laos.[72]

In other situations, Kennedy took tougher stands. When in 1961 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev renewed his threat to cut off access to West Berlin, Kennedy, fearing the damage to US credibility, refused to back down, and Khrushchev yielded instead.[73] Even more dramatically, Kennedy went "eyeball to eyeball" with Khrushchev over the latter's decision to install nuclear weapons in Cuba despite

[65] Wyatt-Brown 2005, 339, 341.
[66] Herring 2008, 732.
[67] Kearns 1976, 258.
[68] Logevall 1999, 393.
[69] Kearns 1976, 253. See also Halberstam 1972, 528–32.
[70] Lebow and Stein 1994, 69–70, 98–102; Herring 2008, 706–709; McMahon 2010.
[71] Logevall argues that although Kennedy was "himself imbued with a good dose of machismo, he was less prone [than Johnson] to extending it to the nation, to the complex world of foreign policy." See Logevall 1999, 399.
[72] Freedman 2000, 293–304; Herring 2008, 706–709. Kennedy's decision not to follow up the Bay of Pigs with a full-scale invasion seems to have had real reputational consequences, as both Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and French President Charles de Gaulle apparently concluded that Kennedy was weak and could be bullied; see Taubman 2004, 493–94. For a contrary view, however, see Lebow and Stein 1994.
[73] Eisenhower had taken a similar position in 1958; see McMahon 2010, 309.

Kennedy's declaration that he would not tolerate "offensive weapons" on the island.[74] Yet in both crises, Kennedy pursued a cautious middle ground between acquiescence and precipitous escalation. In the Cuban missile crisis specifically, Kennedy mainly sided with his more dovish advisers, choosing a blockade of Cuba rather than the air strikes and invasion suggested by the hawks.[75]

Among those hawks was Vice President Johnson. Late in the crisis, for example, Johnson urged retaliation for the downing of an American surveillance plane, on the reputational logic that not responding made the United States appear weak and bulliable. Johnson even disagreed with Kennedy to his face during a meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, which "showed how substantial a difference there was between him and the President," since Johnson's behavior broke from nearly three years of complete loyalty and deference to Kennedy.[76] Johnson's arguments seemed to take authority from Southern folk wisdom. Johnson argued that displaying weakness before Khrushchev, as the US had done by not retaliating for the spy plane downing, was like letting a "mad dog . . . taste . . . a little blood." Describing the dynamic on the last evening of the crisis, Kennedy advisor Ted Sorenson later recalled, "The hawks were rising. . . . Johnson slapped the table. 'All I know is that when I was a boy in Texas, and you were walking along the road when a rattlesnake reared up ready to strike, the only thing to do was to take a stick and chop its head off.' There was a little chill in the room after that statement."[77]

The sometimes subtle effects of concern for reputation are well illustrated by the case of Vietnam. Johnson was initially wary of US involvement in Indochina, at least partly because he anticipated that withdrawal would be costly once America was committed. In 1954, while Democratic leader in the Senate, he had helped derail President Dwight Eisenhower's proposal to aid the French in Vietnam, which Johnson and other Southern leaders anticipated would inevitably lead to further escalation. "Once the flag is committed," they argued "land forces would surely follow," after which "there's no turning back."[78]

---

[74] Herschberg 2010, 68.

[75] Herring 2008, 721–22.

[76] Caro 2012, 193, 218–20.

[77] Caro 2012, 218, 219, 222. Interestingly, Johnson's hawkish position during the Cuba crisis was shared by Southern leaders in Congress, including not only Johnson's close ally Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, but also Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas—later a leading opponent of the Vietnam War—who declared, "I'm in favor . . . of an invasion, and an all-out one, and as quickly as possible." See Caro 2012, 216.

[78] Herring and Immerman 1984, 353; Fite 1991, 359. Kennedy, then a backbench senator, also opposed intervention, but he did so on anticolonial grounds. Johnson's future presidential successor

Similar calculations seem to have underlain Johnson's opposition to the Kennedy-backed coup against Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, which the vice president believed committed the United States irreversibly to the conflict.[79]

Nevertheless, once the US had committed itself to Vietnam, Johnson refused to consider withdrawal and escalated the war with an eventually massive commitment of resources and troops. Whether Kennedy would have acted otherwise has long been a topic of debate. Kennedy apologists have claimed that he planned to withdraw, but other commentators argue that US escalation was structurally overdetermined by political or international factors. It seems fairly certain, however, that under Kennedy a negotiated withdrawal was at least an option, but it was off the table once Johnson took office.[80] While deeply ambivalent about the war, Johnson treated withdrawal as unthinkable, in large part because it would reveal both the country and him to be weak. As Fredrik Logevall has compellingly argued, it is difficult to imagine Kennedy seeing the war as a test of masculinity in the way Johnson did. Put simply, the reputational cost Kennedy ascribed to withdrawing was high, but it was even higher for Johnson. Consequently, Logevall argues, had Kennedy lived he would probably have rejected massive escalation and instead sought a negotiated withdrawal.[81] But Johnson committed enormous resources to avoid losing the war, leaving the task of extricating the nation from the conflict to his successor Richard Nixon.

History rarely poses different leaders with the same foreign policy problems, making it difficult for social scientists to infer what would have been. The Kennedy-Johnson pair comes close to such an ideal comparison. The two individuals vied for the presidency at the same time, occupied the office in immediate succession, and confronted the same or very similar foreign policy problems. And yet despite these structural similarities, Kennedy and Johnson frequently and substantially differed in their approach to interstate conflict, in ways consistent with Johnson's having a greater concern for reputation for resolve. Whereas previous accounts have typically attributed this behavioral variation to idiosyncratic features of the two presidents' personalities, we view it as rooted in part in systematic cultural differences between

Richard Nixon, then vice president, was apparently even more prointervention than Eisenhower, arguing "we must take the risk by putting our boys in" if the French were in danger of defeat; see Herring and Immerman 1984, 356.

[79] Logevall 1998, 36.
[80] Freedman 2000, 403.
[81] Logevall 1998; see also Logevall 1999, especially 375–413.

the South and non-South.[82] But contrasting two presidents goes only so far in establishing the general validity of our argument. We therefore turn to a systematic comparison of Southern and non-Southern presidents across the past two centuries of American history.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

In this section, we evaluate whether the differences between Johnson and Kennedy generalize to all presidents. Using a data set of MIDs from throughout US history, we evaluate whether the conflict behavior of Southern and non-Southern presidents differs systematically in accordance with the three hypotheses derived above. We test these hypotheses in a nonparametric framework, addressing potential confounding by matching presidents on a variety of control variables. Since we are interested in the overall evidence for our theory, we combine the individual hypotheses into a single joint test. We demonstrate that the null hypothesis of no difference in conflict behavior between Southern and non-Southern presidents is implausible under a large variety of coding schemes, conditioning strategies, sample definitions, and test statistics. Other factors correlated with Southernness are unlikely to account for our results.

DATA AND VARIABLES

Our data consist of MIDs involving the United States in the years 1816–2010.[83] Because they correspond more closely to the two-player setup of our theory, we focus on MIDs involving the United States and only one other country, which we refer to as bilateral MIDs (n = 215). We also examine multicountry disputes in which the United States was an originator, which we refer to as multiparty MIDs (n = 296).[84] Thirty-six presidents experienced at least one multiparty MID and thirty-four of them presided over at least one bilateral MID.[85] We categorized every president as being culturally Southern or non-Southern according to the following rule: a president is labeled "Southern" if and only if he (a) was born and raised in the South, or (b) was either born or raised in the South and spent his prepresidential political career there. We define

---

[82] Such sociocultural influences on individual personality differences are a primary focus of the field of cultural psychology, as exemplified by Nisbett and Cohen's work on the Southern culture of honor; see Nisbett and Cohen 1996 and, for a general perspective, Adams 2012.

[83] We used the MID v4.1 data set; Palmer et al. 2015. Following Weeks and Cohen 2009, we drop fishing disputes.

[84] It is worth noting that several important US conflicts, such as the Vietnam War, were multiparty rather than bilateral MIDs.

[85] MIDs are assigned to the president under whom US involvement in the MID began.

"the South" as the states of the former Confederacy plus Arizona, Kentucky, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and West Virginia.[86] Eleven presidents are coded as Southern under this scheme.

We constructed three response variables, one for each hypothesis. *Use of force* is coded 1 if the US reached "use of force" or "war" and coded 0 otherwise. *Duration* is defined as the number of days the dispute lasted, censored at the last day of the originating president's term. *Outcome* is an ordinal variable with three levels, "US loss" (−1), "draw" (0),[87] and "US win" (+1), where the first and third categories are disputes that ended in a victory or yield by one party. The average of *outcome* is equivalent to the proportion of victories minus the proportion of defeats.

The timeline in Figure 1 provides a visual overview of our data set. The figure plots the origin and end date of every MID in which the United States was involved between 1816 and 2011. Placement on the vertical axis, jittered to avoid overplotting, indicates the United States' hostility level, and the shape plotted indicates the dispute outcome.[88] The vertical lines separate the terms of every president in our data set, with Southern presidencies shaded gray. Southern presidencies were least common in the middle of the time period covered by our data, and were especially sparse in the era when the United States was a great power but not yet a superpower (1896–1945). MIDs clearly became much more frequent after 1945. Southern and non-Southern presidents' rates of MID involvement differ slightly but not significantly (1.7 and 1.3 multiparty MIDs per year, respectively).

STATISTICAL METHODS

A key feature of our data set is that the response variables are measured at the level of the militarized dispute but the causal variable of interest varies at the level of the president. Nearly every standard regression technique for analyzing clustered data of this sort leans heavily on parametric assumptions and/or behaves poorly in small samples.[89] For these reasons, we employ a nonparametric approach that avoids the stronger assumptions required by regression and is better suited to analyzing a small number of clusters with an unknown structure of intracluster dependence.

---

[86] This is the cultural definition of the South adopted by Nisbett and Cohen 1996. Our results are robust to alternative codings of presidents' Southernness. See the supplementary material for details on the coding of presidents and disputes; Dafoe and Caughey 2016.

[87] Disputes not resolved by the end of the original president's term are also coded as draws.

[88] Multiparty MIDs, which we drop from the sample we analyze for this study, are plotted semi-transparently.

[89] Angrist and Pischke 2009, chap. 8.

FIGURE 1

TIMELINE OF PRESIDENCIES AND MIDs, 1816–2011[a]

[a]The hollow shapes are located at the end date of the militarized interstate dispute (for both bilateral and multiparty MIDs), with lines extending backward in time to the start date. Gray shading indicates presidents coded as Southern under our coding scheme.

Our approach relies on permutation (randomization) tests, which allow us to evaluate the null hypothesis of no difference between Southerners and non-Southerners under minimal assumptions.[90] To conduct the permutation tests, we randomly shuffle the labels "Southern" and "non-Southern" across presidents, calculating one-sided p-values based on the proportion of permutations with a value of the test statistic at least as supportive of the alternative hypothesis as the one observed. The clustering in the data is respected by permuting at the level of the president rather than the MID, avoiding the need to model the correlation of MIDs within presidencies.[91]

Our main interest is whether the overall pattern of differences across the three dependent variables is consistent with our expectations that Southern presidents increase *use of force, duration*, and *outcome*. To assess the overall evidence, we use nonparametric combination (NPC), a technique new to political science.[92] NPC is a method for combining the results of several hypothesis tests in a way that accounts for the fact that multiple tests on the same sample are typically highly correlated with one another. It does so by combining the p-values of the component tests into a single test statistic, whose observed value is compared to its permutation distribution under the global null hypothesis of no effects on any variable.

The p-value of the NPC test indicates how strongly the observed data deviate from the global null hypothesis in the direction of the specific pattern predicted by our theory.[93] Rejecting the global null, however, does not mean we can reject each component null hypothesis individually with the same level of confidence. To assess the component hypotheses individually, we adjust the variable-specific estimates and associated p-values upward to account for the fact that we test for effects on multiple variables.[94] In keeping with our interest in the overall

---

[90] For an introduction to the use of permutation tests in political science, see Keele, McConnaughy, and White 2012.

[91] Small, Ten Have, and Rosenbaum 2008.

[92] Pesarin and Salmaso 2010; Caughey, Dafoe, and Seawright forthcoming.

[93] Strictly speaking, the global null hypothesis is false if any of the component alternatives are true, a necessary but insufficient condition for our theory to be true. Because we tailor the NPC test to be sensitive to a specific pattern of results, however, the global null is much more likely to be rejected if all predictions are true than if just one is true. We tailor the global test to our specific predictions by using one-sided tests sensitive to positive location shifts, and combining component p-values using Liptak's inverse-normal combining function, which has maximum power when the evidence for all alternative hypotheses is equally strong; see Pesarin and Salmaso 2010, 129.

[94] We adjust the component p-values using a closed testing procedure, which like the Bonferroni correction controls the familywise error rate, but with much less loss of power; for details see Marcus, Peritz, and Gabriel 1976; Basso, Pesarin, and Salmaso 2009, 25–30. We treat each set of three component tests as a "family."

pattern of results, however, our discussion of the statistical analysis focuses primarily on the NPC p-values.[95]

ANALYSIS OF UNMATCHED DATA

Figure 2 plots our central finding, focusing on bilateral disputes. In MIDs presided over by a Southern president, the United States is twice as likely to have used force (a mean difference of +0.24), experienced disputes that lasted on average twice as long (+51 days), and is nearly three times as likely to have achieved a favorable outcome (+0.12) than when a non-Southerner is president.[96] The multiplicity-adjusted p-values for the mean differences are respectively 0.02, 0.05, and 0.09, indicating that we can confidently reject all three component null hypotheses. Moreover, the NPC joint p-value of 0.02 shows that the overall pattern of results is highly inconsistent with the global null.

Can the striking differences in US conflict behavior under Southern and non-Southern presidents support the inference that the differences were *caused* by a Southerner being president? That is, would the interstate conflict behavior of the United States have been any different had, all else equal, a non-Southerner rather than a Southerner been president? We believe such an inference is plausible for several reasons. In large part, our claim to causal inference rests on the design of our study. We chose this case because the processes by which US presidents are selected into office—national elections and vice-presidential succession—are not strongly related to the potential outcomes of interest. Although there are exceptions, as a rule presidential "elections are not decided on foreign policy issues."[97] Even when foreign policy does matter, the international situation on Election Day is often a poor guide to what will unfold over a president's term. Furthermore, three of the Southerners in our data set became president upon the unexpected death of their non-Southern predecessor. In sum, selection effects are less of a concern in this study than they would be if presidential selection were more closely tied to foreign affairs. Nevertheless, in the following section we demonstrate that our results are robust to controlling for potential confounders.

---

[95] Assessing each component prediction separately would be a viable strategy if we had a larger sample size and thus greater statistical power to detect effects on individual variables.

[96] Four bilateral MIDs ended in a US defeat, one of which occurred under a Southerner.

[97] Larson 1985, 317; Almond 1950; though see Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989.

FIGURE 2
DIFFERENCES IN USE OF FORCE, DURATION, AND OUTCOME UNDER
NON-SOUTHERN AND SOUTHERN PRESIDENTS[a]

[a] Circles indicate the variable's average value across bilateral MIDs in each presidency. Circle area is proportional to the number of bilateral MIDs in a presidency, which ranges from one to twenty-four.

ANALYSIS OF MATCHED DATA

To address the concern that these differences in conflict behavior could be due to other differences between Southern and non-Southern presidencies, we match presidents on a number of potential confounders. A survey of the literature yielded over twenty variables thought to influence US use of force abroad.[98] Given the difficulty of selecting an optimal set of control variables,[99] we do not base our conclusions on a single "correct" matched data set, but rather demonstrate the robustness of the results (see Figure 4) to controlling for the following different sets of covariates:

—Basic Covariates: The essential features of the historical and foreign policy context, the year the president assumed office (*year president's term began*), the number of years he served (*president's term length*), indicators for the power status of the United States (*great power* post-1896 and *superpower* post-1945), and proxies for US international commitments and war-weariness (*log years since last war*, MID *ongoing when president entered office*, and *number of* MIDs *in previous five years*).

—Lagged Dependent Variables (DVs): The average values of the *use of force*, log(*duration*), and *outcome* in MIDs that occurred in the five and ten years before the president in question took office.

—Structural Covariates: The basic covariates and lagged DVs, plus five additional variables, *war ongoing when president entered office*, log*(deaths per capita) in last war*, *number of* MIDs *in previous ten years*, *previous president Southern*, and *percent elite veteran*. This covariate set includes all pretreatment control variables, that is, those realized before the relevant president entered office. The first three variables are additional controls for the foreign policy context. *Previous president Southern* is the lag of the treatment variable. *Percent elite veteran* accounts for the possibility that US use of force is influenced by the proportion of the US political elite who served in the military.[100]

—Party Covariates: All the structural covariates, plus indicators for whether the president is a *Whig* or *Democrat/Democratic-Republican*.

—In-Term Covariates: All the party covariates, plus the proportions of the president's term spent in an economic recession (*proportion in recession*) and under unified party government (*proportion unified*).[101]

—All Covariates: All the preceding covariates, plus the number of multiparty MIDs the president experienced and an indicator for presidents who served in the military.

[98]   We relied especially on Fordham 1998, Gelpi and Feaver 2002, Howell and Pevehouse 2005, James and Oneal 1991, Meernik 1994, Ostrom and Job 1986, and Park 2010.
[99]   There is in general no guarantee that controlling for more confounders will reduce bias on the casual estimates of interest; see Clarke 2005.
[100]   Gelpi and Feaver 2002.
[101]   See, for example, Howell and Pevehouse 2005.

To comprehensively evaluate the robustness of our findings, we varied the statistical analyses in four other key respects: (1) the use of matching with or without replacement; (2) the sample of MIDs (bilateral or multiparty); (3) the test statistics used in the individual permutation tests; and (4) the presidents coded as Southern. The four sets of test statistics we examined are mean differences, rank statistic,[102] weighted mean differences,[103] and hierarchical regression coefficients.[104] The regional coding of two presidents, Harry Truman (initially coded non-Southern) and George W. Bush (initially Southern), were found to be sensitive to alternative definitions of the South and consideration of presidents' ethnocultural ancestry.[105]

For each combination of coding scheme, covariate set, replacement setting, and MID sample, we searched for the optimal set of one-to-one average treatment effect on the treated matches using the R function GenMatch.[106] Figure 3 lists the matched pairs of Southern and non-Southern presidents created with each combination of control variables for our original coding of Southernness among presidents who experienced at least one bilateral MID (see the supplementary material for the other matched sets).[107] For each matched set, the figure also provides indicators of covariate balance and summarizes the evidence for our hypotheses.

As Figure 3 shows, creating matched pairs of presidents substantially improves covariate balance, especially when relatively few covariates are used to match. For the basic covariates, the postmatching balance is nearly perfect (all balance-test p-values are above 0.3). Even when all twenty-four covariates are used, the worst-balanced covariate is still only marginally significant. For a more stringent test of as-if-random treatment assignment in the matched data, we also conducted placebo tests using the six lagged DVs.[108] None of the ninety-six omnibus

[102] Rank statistics are robust to outliers. We use the log-rank statistic for *duration* and the difference of mean ranks for the other two variables.

[103] We take the weighted average of the pair-specific mean differences, with weights proportional to the harmonic mean number of MIDs per president in the pair. Hansen and Bowers 2008 show that these weights have certain optimality properties when matching is done at the level of the cluster. We do not report this statistic for unmatched data because it yields the same result as the simple difference of means.

[104] We use the z statistic corresponding to the treatment coefficient in a hierarchical model with president-specific random intercepts. Logit, Cox proportional hazard, and linear regression models are used for *use of force*, *duration*, and *outcome*, respectively. The use of model-derived test statistics in permutation inference is discussed by Imbens and Rubin 2015, 64–72, and applied by Erikson, Pinto, and Rader 2010.

[105] See the supplementary material for full details; Dafoe and Caughey 2016.

[106] Sekhon 2011. For each candidate set of matches, GenMatch assesses balance by conducting Kolmogrov-Smirnov and t tests on every covariate, treating each president as a single observation. The optimal matched set is the one that maximizes the minimum p-value across balance tests.

[107] Dafoe and Caughey 2016.

[108] For a discussion of placebo tests, see Sekhon 2009, 501–503.

Southerner	Basic	Lagged DVs	Structural	Party	In-Term	All
Presidents						
Madison	Fillmore	T. Roosevelt	T. Roosevelt	Van Buren	Van Buren	Obama
Monroe	Fillmore	T. Roosevelt	F. Roosevelt	T. Roosevelt	T. Roosevelt	Grant
Jackson	Lincoln	F. Roosevelt	F. Roosevelt	F. Roosevelt	F. Roosevelt	F. Roosevelt
Tyler	Van Buren	Nixon	Buchanan	Buchanan	Buchanan	Van Buren
Polk	Van Buren	Obama	Van Buren	Van Buren	Buchanan	Van Buren
A. Johnson	Fillmore	Truman	Arthur	Arthur	Cleveland	Coolidge
Wilson	F. Roosevelt	Buchanan	Buchanan	T. Roosevelt	T. Roosevelt	F. Roosevelt
L. Johnson	Kennedy	G. H. W. Bush	G. H. W. Bush	Kennedy	Kennedy	Kennedy
Carter	Reagan	F. Roosevelt	Ford	Ford	Truman	Ford
Clinton	Ford	Obama	Obama	Obama	Obama	Obama
G. W. Bush	Reagan	Nixon	Obama	Obama	Obama	Reagan
Balance						
Most-imbal'd matching cov.	*pres. term length (yrs.)*	*outcome last 5 yrs.*	*year pres. term began*	*year pres. term began*	*prop. unified government*	*log duration last 5 yrs.*
Mean diff.	+0.79	+0.12	−29.8	−22.5	−0.16	−0.80
Std. mean diff.	+0.32	+0.31	−0.39	−0.30	−0.47	−0.75
Log SD ratio	−0.26	+0.32	+0.17	+0.17	+0.21	−0.03
DVs						
Use of force	+0.35 (0.01)	+0.22 (0.11)	+0.25 (0.08)	+0.33 (0.04)	+0.34 (0.00)	+0.19 (0.22)
Duration	+38.5 (0.18)	+32.3 (0.18)	+43.7 (0.18)	+51.1 (0.02)	+36.5 (0.18)	+31.5 (0.25)
Outcome	+0.26 (0.12)	+0.22 (0.03)	+0.26 (0.02)	+0.20 (0.11)	+0.20 (0.10)	+0.15 (0.16)
NPC *p*-value	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.15

Matching with Replacement

Southerner	Basic	Lagged DVs	Structural	Party	In-Term	All
Presidents						
Madison	Fillmore	T. Roosevelt	Fillmore	Arthur	Arthur	Grant
Monroe	T. Roosevelt	Grant	Van Buren	T. Roosevelt	T. Roosevelt	T. Roosevelt
Jackson	Cleveland	Harding	F. Roosevelt	Grant	Cleveland	Coolidge
Tyler	Lincoln	Buchanan	Buchanan	Buchanan	Buchanan	Van Buren
Polk	Van Buren	Obama	Pierce	Van Buren	Van Buren	Cleveland
A. Johnson	Pierce	Truman	Arthur	Lincoln	Grant	Buchanan
Wilson	Grant	G. H. W. Bush	T. Roosevelt	F. Roosevelt	F. Roosevelt	F. Roosevelt
L. Johnson	Nixon	Lincoln	G. H. W. Bush	G. H. W. Bush	Kennedy	Kennedy
Carter	Ford	Ford	Ford	Ford	Ford	Ford
Clinton	Reagan	F. Roosevelt	Reagan	Obama	Obama	Obama
G. W. Bush	Eisenhower	Nixon	Obama	Nixon	G. H. W. Bush	Reagan
Balance						
Most-imbal'd matching cov.	*year. pres. term began*	*use of force last 5 yrs.*	*log % dead in last war*	*democrat or dem.-rep.*	*use of force last 5 yrs.*	*use of force last 5 yrs.*
Mean diff.	−7.30	+0.18	−0.98	+0.45	+0.30	+0.28
Std. mean diff.	−0.10	+0.49	−0.37	+1.12	+0.82	+0.77
Log SD ratio	+0.30	+0.41	+0.37	−0.22	+0.44	+0.51
DVs						
Use of force	+0.28 (0.05)	+0.23 (0.07)	+0.28 (0.06)	+0.23 (0.08)	+0.29 (0.04)	+0.21 (0.12)
Duration	+63.8 (0.04)	+51.1 (0.10)	+50.6 (0.06)	+57.7 (0.01)	+51.6 (0.02)	+35.6 (0.13)
Outcome	+0.24 (0.02)	+0.25 (0.03)	+0.25 (0.05)	+0.25 (0.03)	+0.22 (0.03)	+0.12 (0.19)
NPC *p*-value	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.07

Matching without Replacement

FIGURE 3

NON-SOUTHERNERS MATCHED TO SOUTHERN PRESIDENTS [a]

[a] For each president coded as Southern under our preferred coding scheme, this table lists the non-Southerner matched to him, with and without replacement, using six sets of matching covariates. In each chart, the middle section presents the most imbalanced covariate among those used to create each set of matches and the associated measures of balance (treated-control mean difference, standardized mean difference, and log standard deviation ratio). The bottom section presents weighted difference-of-means statistics for each dependent variable, with multiplicity-adjusted p-values in parentheses. The last row provides the *p*-value of the NPC joint test.

balance tests of the lagged DVs rejects the global null at the 0.1 level, including the sixteen for presidents matched on basic covariates alone.[109] The results for individual lagged DVs are more variable, however. The lagged DVs averaged over the preceding ten years are well balanced, but when averaged over the preceding five years there are marginally significant differences: *use of force* is higher under Southerners ($z \approx +1.7$) and log(*duration*) is lower ($z \approx -1.7$). We discuss these results below. Full details are available in the supplementary material.[110]

Figure 4 summarizes the NPC joint p-values for the 408 different specifications arising from every combination of regional codings (represented by columns), matching variable sets (rows), replacement settings, MID samples, and test statistics. Overall, the results provide consistent evidence of systematic differences in the conflict behavior of Southern and non-Southern presidents. Across all specifications, the median NPC p-value is 0.06 and the interquartile interval (IQI) is (0.02, 0.12). The evidence is even clearer under our preferred regional coding scheme, with a median p-value of 0.03 and an IQI of (0.01, 0.08).

Our expectations are also borne out for each dependent variable individually. For all three variables, the vast majority of test statistics across the 408 specifications are in the direction predicted by our theory.[111] Across specifications, the median multiplicity-adjusted p-values for *use of force*, *duration*, and *outcome* are, respectively, 0.14, 0.11, and 0.22, and the median estimated average treatment effects are +0.19, +58, and +0.06, respectively. In sum, though the evidence is somewhat stronger for *use of force* and *duration* than for *outcome*, it is clear that the results of the global test are not driven by a single variable but rather by a coherent pattern of results. Thus, taken as a whole, the statistical results not only demonstrate that the null of no regional differences between presidents is implausible, but also provide support for the specific predictions of our theory.

RULING OUT ALTERNATIVE CAUSAL MECHANISMS

We have shown that US dispute behavior differs markedly when a Southerner is president. This finding does not, however, necessarily prove that the effect of Southern presidencies is mediated through greater concern for reputation. In this section we consider whether another aspect of Southernness could be the causal mechanism at work.

[109] We conducted the omnibus tests using the *RItools* package of Bowers, Fredrickson, and Hansen 2010.
[110] Dafoe and Caughey 2016.
[111] The test statistic is positive in 95.1 percent of specifications for *use of force*, 99.8 percent for *duration*, and 90.0 percent for *outcome*.

FIGURE 4
ROBUSTNESS TESTS[a]

[a] Nonparametric combination joint p-values for the three outcome variables based on 408 combinations of coding schemes (represented by columns), matching variable sets (rows), replacement settings, MID samples, and test statistics. The unmatched results are based on thirty-six presidents (thirty-four in the case of bilateral MIDs). The matched samples contain ten, eleven, or twelve pairs of presidents, depending on the number of presidents coded as Southern.

Scholars have identified a variety of factors shaping Southerners' orientation toward foreign affairs. Joseph Fry identifies five such influences: attachment to honor and military prowess, commitment to white supremacy, agrarian economic interests, fear of centralized state authority, and loyalty to the Democratic Party.[112] Edward Chester emphasizes the South's rural agrarianism, loyalty to the Democratic Party, and system of racial apartheid.[113] Richard Bensel offers a similar list of alternatives to honor, though with greater emphasis on Southern support for free trade and hostility to a permanent national military establishment before World War II.[114] Alfred Hero highlights the region's "cautious, conservative view of international relations," its pessimism about the prospects for international harmony, and its esteem for military virtues.[115] More generally, scholars stress that through the mid-twentieth century, the South was poorer, more rural, more hierarchical, and less egalitarian than the rest of the nation, with a much larger black population and an ethnically more homogenous white population.

For one of the regional differences listed above to offer a plausible alternative explanation to honor, it would have to satisfy three conditions. First, Southern and non-Southern presidents themselves would have to differ with respect to the alternative factor, as they do in their attachment to honor. Second, it must be plausible that the rival factor causally accounts for the pattern of differences we find. Third, the factor should not be an aspect or consequence of the culture of honor.

The foreign-policy effects of the South's system of racial hierarchy, which persisted a century after the abolition of slavery, were complicated.[116] On one hand, Southern elites' desire to insulate their racial system from external interference rendered them hostile to a powerful central government with a standing army.[117] Southerners also feared that US imperialism would lead to the incorporation of nonwhites into the polity.[118] These effects could lead Southerners to be less hawkish on foreign policy, especially regarding imperialist activities. On the other hand, it is possible that racism caused Southern presidents to underestimate the capabilities of or to be more hostile toward nonwhite foreign adversaries, leading to more conflicts with them. To evaluate the

[112] Fry 2002, 5–6.
[113] Chester 1975, 274–85.
[114] Bensel 1984. Trubowitz 1992 offers an argument similar in spirit to Bensel's that emphasizes economic conflict between the declining industrial core and the rising Sunbelt since the late 1960s.
[115] Hero 1965, 81 and passim.
[116] Racism was hardly unique to the South; racial hierarchy was a core assumption of American foreign policy ideology for most of US history; see Hunt 1987, 46–91.
[117] Bensel 1984, 404–405.
[118] Fry 2002, 109.

above possibility, we examined whether Southerners were more likely to get into disputes with nonwhite opponents (non-European countries other than Canada and Australia). We found that the opponents of the US under Southern presidents were actually somewhat less likely to be nonwhite countries. In summary, differences in racial attitudes might account for some differences in conflict behavior, but we do not see a compelling argument by which these differences would translate into the precise patterns of conflict behavior that we observed.

Other explanations also fail to meet at least one of the conditions listed above. The rural and agrarian nature of Southern society may have been one reason why cultures of honor that were imported from elsewhere continued to flourish there.[119] In addition, the South's status as an economically peripheral region dependent on export-oriented agriculture caused it to oppose protectionist tariffs and contributed to its resistance to US acquisition of colonies that would compete with Southern staples.[120] Other than by sustaining the culture of honor, it is difficult to see how agrarianism would lead to the interstate conflict patterns we observe.

The same can be said of Southern fears of centralized state authority and a standing military, the effects of which would seem to run counter to the effects of honor. Loyalty to the Democratic Party is also an unlikely alternative explanation. For much of US history, the Democrats have been less enthusiastic about foreign interventionism than their partisan rivals. In any case, matching presidents to control for party affiliation yields the same pattern of results. As for wealth and race, there are few differences between Southern and non-Southern presidents on these factors: nearly every president in our time period was a rich white male.

In addition, there is Southerners' oft-noted valorization of the military and martial virtues. Separating Southern militarism from the culture of honor is difficult, as the former could easily be an aspect or consequence of the latter. Nevertheless, militarism does offer a potential alternative mechanism to honor or to concern for reputation; if Southerners simply are more willing to fight, it might cause behavior similar to that predicted by our reputational model. We do match presidents on military service, finding the same results, but this may not fully account for attitudinal differences between presidents. The militarism hypothesis, however, seems contrary to our finding that Southerners

[119] Nisbett and Cohen 1996.
[120] Bensel 1984.

and non-Southerners become involved in disputes at approximately the same rate. In addition, it is not consistent with the qualitative historical evidence that Southerners have often been ambivalent about a standing army and military adventurism until after a conflict is under way.

In sum, although explanations besides the culture of honor cannot be completely ruled out, no other major regional difference mentioned in the literature provides a compelling theoretical account for the pattern of results we document. Nor is there persuasive qualitative or quantitative evidence for these alternative mechanisms. By contrast, there is deep and compelling evidence, drawing on the historical literature and extrapolating from well-documented differences in mass opinion and behavior, that Southern presidents tend to be more concerned with reputation for resolve than non-Southern presidents, and that this difference could plausibly give rise to the pattern of outcomes that we observe.

One remaining threat to our inference is suggested by the results of the placebo tests. Although the omnibus balance tests—especially for presidents matched on the basic covariates—are consistent with as-if-random assignment, the marginally significant differences on five year lagged *use of force* suggests the possibility of selection effects. It is possible, for example, that Southern presidents are selected into office during periods of heightened international tension precisely because of their distinctive approach to interstate conflict. Mitigating this concern is the fact that MID *duration* tends to be somewhat lower in the five years preceding Southern presidential administrations, contrary to the theorized effects of honor. This suggests that international tension may not be higher when Southerners come to power. More generally, it provides evidence against the class of confounding processes in which the outcome variables and the probability of the president being Southern happen to covary in the same manner as predicted by our theory. The possibility that Southerners' attachment to honor leads them to be selected into office during unusual times is an intriguing one and merits further investigation in future research.

Conclusion

Southern US presidents, socialized in a culture that emphasizes reputation for resolve, behave differently in militarized interstate disputes than non-Southern presidents. Southern presidents are twice as likely to use force, experience disputes that last on average twice as long, and are three times as likely to achieve victory. These findings are consistent

with Southerners being more concerned with reputation for resolve, and are unlikely to have been caused by other factors correlated with Southern presidencies. These results provide evidence of the powerful ways that concern for reputation shapes interstate conflict.

We do not intend to suggest that every Southern president has displayed heightened concern for reputation for resolve. "Honor did not create one temperament, one personality," reminds one historian, "any more than does any other culture."[121] Jimmy Carter, for example, seems to have been relatively unconcerned with reputation for resolve, a characteristic apparently reflected in his interstate conflict behavior as president (see Figure 2). As the American South has converged culturally with the rest of the nation,[122] it is likely that regional differences in presidents' concern for reputation have diminished. Nevertheless, viewed over the span of American history, the differences between Southern and non-Southern presidents are remarkably large and robust.

Our research does not imply that Southerners are excessively concerned with reputation, any more than it implies that non-Southerners are too little concerned with it. The optimal level of concern for reputation is an elusive quantity, as it depends on the effects of US actions on the (strategically masked) beliefs of its potential future adversaries. Contemporary disagreements about the importance of upholding President Barak Obama's "red line" in Syria reflect this uncertainty about the value of maintaining deterrent commitments.[123]

While interesting in themselves, our results have important theoretical implications. Most directly, they provide evidence consistent with the strongest claims about the importance of concern for reputation. Concern for reputation is some of the dark matter of international relations; it is necessary for many theories of international relations but it eludes scientific study.[124] Regardless of the degree to which reputation influences outcomes,[125] actors' concern for their reputation appears to have large effects. Leaders more concerned with reputation for resolve are more likely to prevail in militarized conflicts with other countries, though at the cost of longer and more violent—though not necessarily more frequent—interstate disputes. It is important to keep in mind that even our control group of non-Southern presidents placed high value on reputation, and so the full effects of concern for reputation in inter-

---

[121] Ayers 1984, 19.
[122] Egerton 1974.
[123] Walt 2013; Miller 2014.
[124] Dafoe 2012, sec. 5.1.
[125] For doubts on this score, see Press 2005.

national relations are probably even larger than the effects we estimate in this study.

Our study has implications for other literatures as well. It contributes to the study of the importance of leaders,[126] and specifically to the extensive but largely qualitative literature on the US presidency.[127] Diplomatic historians and others have long regarded the personality, predilections, and worldview of individual leaders as critical to the dynamics of international relations. However, due to difficulties in design, the scientific study of international relations has largely relegated differences in the worldview of individual leaders to the error term—idiosyncratic variation immune to generalization. Our study, by identifying a systematic cultural cause of leaders' outlooks, suggests a research strategy for making sense of leader-specific variation, and our empirical results lend strong support to those who regard individual leaders as having potentially great importance.

Our work also sheds light on the important but hard-to-study role of culture in politics.[128] By showing that state behavior varies systematically with the cultural background of the leader, our analysis isolates an instance in which culture influences political outcomes in important ways. This finding offers a new perspective on the role of sectionalism in American political development. It suggests that sectionalism matters not only because of differences in the regions' economic and political interests,[129] but also because of deep-seated cultural differences between Southerners and non-Southerners.

Our results suggest a new perspective on the question of to whom reputations adhere.[130] If individuals' preferences or worldviews vary systematically by region or culture, then assessments of leader resolve ought to take the leader's background into account.[131] Thus, when cultures are especially influential in shaping leaders, reputations are likely to adhere to the culture in addition to the individual and the state.

These substantive insights are made possible by an innovative multimethod approach that closely integrates qualitative evidence, formal theory, research design, and nonparametric statistical methods. We introduce a powerful new technique to political science, the nonparametric combination of tests, which has potentially wide application. NPC is

[126] Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Saunders 2011; Colgan 2013; Jervis 2013; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015.
[127] See, for example, Skowronek 1993; Greenstein 2000.
[128] See, for example, Johnston 1995.
[129] Bensel 1984; Trubowitz 1992.
[130] Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014, 385; Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth 2014.
[131] Goldgeier 1994.

particularly valuable for testing multiple predictions deduced from a single theory under conditions, such as small sample sizes, in which statistical power is otherwise limited. We anticipate that this simple but powerful method will prove useful to scholars who seek to take full advantage of rich theories.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

Supplementary material for this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887115000416.

REFERENCES

Adams, Glenn. 2012. "Context in Person, Person in Context: A Cultural Psychology Approach to Social-Personality Psychology." In Kay Deaux and Mark Snyder, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Aldrich, John, John Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida. 1989. "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience?'" *American Political Science Review* 83, no. 1: 123–41.

Almond, Gabriel A. 1950. *The American People and Foreign Policy*. New York, N.Y.: Harcourt.

American National Election Studies. 2008. *The ANES 2008 Time Series Study* [data set]. Stanford University and the University of Michigan [producers]. At www.electionstudies.org.

Angrist, Joshua David, and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Ayers, Edward L. 1984. *Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19th-Century American South*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

———. 1989. "Honor." In Charles Reagan Wilson and William R. Ferris, eds., *Encyclopedia of Southern Culture*. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press: 1483–84.

Basso, Dario, Fortunato Pesarin, and Luigi Salmaso. 2009. *Permutation Tests for Stochastic Ordering and ANOVA: Theory and Applications with R*. London, UK: Springer.

Bensel, Richard. 1984. *Sectionalism and American Political Development: 1880–1980*. Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1966. "The Sentiment of Honor in Kabyte Society." In J. G. Peristiany, ed., *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*. London, UK: University of Chicago Press/Weidenfeld and Nicolson: 191–241.

Bowers, Jake, Mark Fredrickson, and Ben Hansen. 2010. *RItools: Randomization Inference Tools*. R package version, 0.1-11. At http://www.jakebowers.org/RItools.html, accessed July 30, 2015.

Bowman, James. 2007. *Honor: A History*. New York, N.Y.: Encounter Books.

Brutger, Ryan, and Joshua D. Kertzer. 2015. "Exploring the Microfoundations of Reputation Costs." Manuscript, Harvard University. At https://perma.cc /G5DF-6977.

Bush, George W. 2004. "Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union." January 20. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. At https://perma.cc/5EER-S8TK.

Campbell, John K. 1964. *Honour, Family and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community.* Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Caro, Robert A. 2012. *The Passage of Power: The Years of Lyndon Johnson.* New York, N.Y.: Knopf.

Caughey, Devin, Allan Dafoe, and Jason Seawright. Forthcoming. "Nonparametric Combination (NPC) A Framework for Testing Elaborate Theories." *Journal of Politics.*

Caverley, Jonathan D. 2010. "The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam." *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter): 119–57.

Chester, Edward W. 1975. *Sectionalism, Politics, and American Diplomacy.* Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press.

Chiozza, Giacomo, and Hein E. Goemans. 2011. *Leaders and International Conflict.* New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Clarke, Kevin. 2005. "The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric Research." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22, no. 4: 341–52.

Cohen, Dov J., and Richard E. Nisbett. 1994. "Self-Protection and the Culture of Honor: Explaining Southern Homicide." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 20, no. 5: 551–67.

Cohen, Dov J., Richard Nisbett, Brian Bowdle, and Norbert Schwarz. 1996. "Insult, Aggression, and the Southern Culture of Honor: An 'Experimental Ethnography'." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 70, no. 5: 945–60.

Cohen, Dov J., Joseph A. Vandello, Sylvia Puente, and Adrian Rantilla. 1999. "'When You Call Me That, Smile!' How Norms for Politeness, Interaction Styles, and Aggression Work Together in Southern Culture." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 62, no. 3: 257–75.

Colgan, Jeff D. 2013. "Domestic Revolutionary Leaders and International Conflict." *World Politics* 65, no. 4 (October): 656–90.

Cooney, Mark. 2013. "Honor Cultures and Violence." *Oxford Bibliographies Online: Criminology.* At https://perma.cc/J643-QX4J.

Cooper, William J. 1983. *Liberty and Slavery: Southern Politics to 1860.* New York, N.Y.: Knopf.

Costigliola, Frank. 2010. "US Foreign Policy from Kennedy to Johnson." In Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War.* Vol. 2, *Crisis and Détente.* New York: Cambridge University Press: 112–33.

Dafoe, Allan. 2012. "Resolve, Reputation, and War: Cultures of Honor and Leaders' Time-in-Office." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley.

Dafoe, Allan, and Devin Caughey. 2015. "Models of Escalation and Reputation Engagement." Manuscript. At www.allandafoe.com/southernhonor.

———. 2016. Supplementary material. At http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887 115000416.

Dafoe, Allan, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth. 2014. "Reputation and Status as Motives for War." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 371–93.

Downes, Alexander B., and Todd S. Sechser. 2012. "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility." *International Organization* 66, no. 3: 467–89.

Dunning, Thad. 2012. *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach.* New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Egerton, John. 1974. *The Americanization of Dixie: The Southernization of America.* New York, N.Y.: Harper's Magazine Press.

Erikson, Robert S., Pablo M. Pinto, and Kelly T. Rader. 2010. "Randomization Tests and Multi-Level Data in State Politics." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 10, no. 2: 180–98.

Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3: 577–92.

———. 2002. "Selection Effects and Deterrence." *International Interactions* 28, no. 1: 5–29.

Fischer, David Hackett. 1989. *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America.* New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Fite, Gilbert C. 1991. *Richard B. Russell, Jr.: Senator From Georgia.* Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press.

Fordham, Benjamin. 1998. "The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy Model of US Uses of Force, 1949–1994." *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 3: 567–90.

Franklin, John Hope. 1970. *The Militant South, 1800–1861.* Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2000. *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam.* New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Freeman, Joanne B. 2001. *Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Fry, Joseph A. 2002. *Dixie Looks Abroad: The South and US Foreign Relations, 1789–1973.* Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press.

Gelpi, Christopher, and Peter D. Feaver. 2002. "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force." *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 4: 779–93.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Golby, James, and Rachel M. Stein. 2011. "Honor among Elites: Self-Defense, Retribution, and Support for War." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, September 1–4.

Goldgeier, James M. 1994. *Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev.* Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Greenberg, Kenneth S. 1990. "The Nose, the Lie, and the Duel in the Antebellum South." *American Historical Review* 95, no. 1: 57–74.

Greenstein, Fred I. 2000. *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton.* New York, N.Y.: Martin Kessler Books.

Halberstam, David. 1972. *The Best and the Brightest.* New York, N.Y.: Random House.

Hansen, Ben B., and Jake Bowers. 2008. "Covariate Balance in Simple, Stratified and Clustered Comparative Studies." *Statistical Science* 23, no. 2: 219–36.

Hero, Alfred O. 1965. *The Southerner and World Affairs.* Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press.

Herring, George C. 2008. *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations since 1776. The Oxford History of the United States.* New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Herring, George C., and Richard H. Immerman. 1984. "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: 'The Day We Didn't Go to War' Revisited." *Journal of American History* 71, no. 2: 343–63.

Herschberg, James G. 2010. "The Cuban Missile Crisis." In Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War.* Vol. 2, *Crisis and Détente*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press: 65–87.

Hobbes, Thomas. [1651] 1985. *Leviathan.* London, UK: Penguin.

Horowitz, Michael C., Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis. 2015. *Why Leaders Fight.* New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Hospodor, Gregory S. 1999. "'Bound by All the Ties of Honor': Southern Honor, the Mississippians, and the Mexican War." *Journal of Mississippi History* 61, (Spring): 1–28.

Howell, William G., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2005. "Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force." *International Organization* 59, no. 1: 209–32.

Hunt, Michael H. 1987. *Ideology and US Foreign Policy.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Huth, Paul K. 1997. "Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment." *Security Studies* 7, no. 1: 72–99.

Hyde, Susan D. 2010. "The Future of Field Experiments in International Relations." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 628, no. 1: 72–84.

Imbens, Guido W., and Donald B. Rubin. 2015. *Causal Inference in Statistics, Social, and Biomedical Sciences: An Introduction.* New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Jacobs, Bruce A., and Richard Wright. 2006. *Street Justice: Retaliation in the Criminal Underworld.* New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

James, Mervyn. 1986. "English Politics and the Concept of Honour, 1485–1642." In Mervyn James, ed., *Society, Politics and Culture, Studies in Early Modern England.* New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

James, Patrick, and John R. Oneal. 1991. "The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President's Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2: 307–32.

Jefferson, Thomas. 1785. *To John Jay, Paris, 23 August. The Letters of Thomas Jefferson.* At https://perma.cc/8N88-X93H.

Jervis, Robert. 1970. *The Logic of Images.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
———. 2012. "Fighting for Standing or Standing to Fight?" *Security Studies* 21, no. 2: 336–44.
———. 2013. "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?" *Security Studies* 22, no. 2: 153–79.

Jervis, Robert, and Jack Snyder. 1991. *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland.* New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1995. "Thinking about Strategic Culture." *International Security* 19, no. 4: 32–64.

Kagan, Donald. 1995. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace.* New York, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Kearns, Doris. 1976. *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream.* New York, N.Y.: Harper & Row.

Keele, Luke, Corrine McConnaughy, and Ismail White. 2012. "Strengthening the Experimenter's Toolbox: Statistical Estimation of Internal Validity." *American Journal of Political Science* 56, no. 2: 484–99.

Kissinger, Henry. 1994. *Diplomacy.* New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster.

Krause, Sharon R. 2002. *Liberalism with Honor.* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Larson, Deborah Welch. 1985. *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 2008. *A Cultural Theory of International Relations.* New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2010. *Why Nations Fight.* New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein. 1994. *We All Lost the Cold War.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Levy, Jack S., Michael K. McKoy, Paul Poast, and Geoffrey P. R. Wallace. 2015. "Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory." *American Journal of Political Science* 59, no. 4: 988–1001.

Logevall, Fredrik. 1998. "Vietnam and the Question of What Might Have Been." In Mark J. White, ed., *Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited.* London, UK: Macmillan.

———. 1999. *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam.* Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.

Marcus, Ruth, Eric Peritz, and K. R. Gabriel. 1976. "On Closed Testing Procedures with Special Reference to Ordered Analysis of Variance." *Biometrika* 63, no. 3: 655–60.

Markey, Daniel. 1999. "Prestige and the Origins of War: Returning to Realism's Roots." *Security Studies* 8, no. 4: 126–72.

Markus, Hazel Rose, and Maryam G. Hamedani. 2007. "Sociocultural Psychology: The Dynamic Interdependence among Self Systems and Social Systems." In Shinobu Kitayama and Dov J. Cohen, eds., *Handbook of Cultural Psychology.* New York, N.Y.: Guilford Press.

McElreath, Richard. 2003. "Reputation and the Evolution of Conflict." *Journal of Theoretical Biology* 220, no. 3: 345–57.

McMahon, Robert J. 2010. "US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy." In Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War.* Vol. 1: *Origins.* New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press: 288–311.

McWhiney, Grady. 1988. *Cracker Culture: Celtic Ways in the Old South.* Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press.

Mead, William Russell. 2002. *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World.* New York, N.Y.: Routledge.

Meernik, James. 1994. "Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force." *International Studies Quarterly* 38, no. 1: 121–38.

Mercer, Jonathan. 1996. *Reputation and International Politics.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Miller, S. A. 2014. "The Knives Are Out: Panetta Eviscerates Obama's 'Red

Line' Blunder on Syria," Washington Times, October 7. At https://perma.cc
/R22P-NRYJ.

Miller, William Ian. 2005. *Eye for an Eye.* New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University
Press.

Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. 1948. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power
and Peace.* New York, N.Y.: Knopf.

Nisbett, Richard E., and Dov Cohen. 1996. *Culture of Honor: The Psychology of
Violence in the South.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

O'Neill, Barry. 1999. *Honor, Symbols, and War.* Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of
Michigan Press.

Ostrom, Charles W., and Brian L. Job. 1986. "The President and the Political Use
of Force." *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 2: 541–66.

Palmer, Glenn, Vito D'Orazio, Michael Kenwick, and Matthew Lane. 2015.
"The MID4 dataset, 2002–2010: Procedures, coding rules and description."
Conflict Management and Peace Science 32, (2): 222–42.

Park, Jong Hee. 2010. "Structural Change in US Presidents' Use of Force." *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 3: 766–82.

Patterson, Orlando. 1985. *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Peristiany, J. G., ed. 1966. *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society.*
Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.

Pesarin, Fortunato, and Luigi Salmaso. 2010. *Permutation Tests for Complex Data:
Theory, Applications, and Software.* Chichester, UK: Wiley.

Pitt-Rivers, Julian. 1968. "Honor." In David Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences.* New York: N.Y.: Macmillan.

Press, Daryl G. 2005. *Calculating Credibility.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press.

Quirk, Robert E. 1967. *An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of
Veracruz.* New York, N.Y.: Norton.

Renshon, Jonathan, Allan Dafoe, and Paul Huth. 2015. "To Whom Do Reputations Adhere: Experimental Evidence on Influence-Specific Reputation."
Manuscript. At www./allandafoe.com/ISR.pdf.

Risjord, Norman K. 1961. "1812: Conservatives, War Hawks, and the Nation's
Honor." *William and Mary Quarterly* 18, no. 3: 196–210.

Robinson, Gregory, John E. McNulty, and Jonathan S. Krasno. 2009. "Observing
the Counterfactual? The Search for Political Experiments in Nature." *Political
Analysis* 17, no. 4: 341–57.

Saunders, Elizabeth N. 2009. "Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins
of Intervention Strategy." *International Security* 34, no. 2: 119–61.

———. 2011. *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions.* Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Schopenhauer, Arthur. 2004. *The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer: The Wisdom of
Life.* Translated by T. Bailey Saunders. Project Gutenberg. At https://perma.cc
/46HN-NMJN.

Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001a. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy.* New York, N.Y.:
Cambridge University Press.

———. 2001b. "Looking for Audience Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 1: 32–60.

Sechser, Todd S. 2007. "Winning Without a Fight: Power, Reputation, and Compellent Threats in International Crises." Ph.D. diss., Stanford University.

———. 2013. "Reputations and Coercion." Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 29–September 1.

Sekhon, Jasjeet S. 2009. "Opiates for the Matches: Matching Methods for Causal Inference." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, no. 1: 487–508.

———. 2011. "Multivariate and Propensity Score Matching Software with Automated Balance Optimization: The Matching Package for R." *Journal of Statistical Software* 42, no. 7: 1–52.

Sekhon, Jasjeet S., and Rocío Titiunik. 2012. "When Natural Experiments Are Neither Natural Nor Experiments." *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 1: 35–57.

Skowronek, Stephen. 1993. *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.

Slantchev, Branislav L. 2011. *Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Small, Dylan S., Thomas R. Ten Have, and Paul R. Rosenbaum. 2008. "Randomization Inference in a Group-Randomized Trial of Treatments for Depression." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 103, no. 481: 271–79.

Snyder, Glenn Herald, and Paul Diesing. 1977. *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Stein, Rachel M. 2015. "War and Revenge: Explaining Conflict Initiation by Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 3: 556–73.

Stevenson, Dennis Matthew. 2004. "War, Words, and the Southern Way: The Florida Acquisition and the Rhetoric of Southern Honor." Master's thesis. University of Florida, Gainsville.

Stewart, Frank Henderson. 1994. *Honor*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.

Tang, Shiping. 2005. "Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict." *Security Studies* 14, no. 1: 34–62.

Taubman, William. 2004. *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era*. New York, N.Y.: Norton.

Thucydides. 1972. *History of the Peloponnesian War,* rev. ed. M. I. Findlay, ed., and Rex Warner, trans., New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books.

Tingley, Dustin H., and Barbara F. Walter. 2011a. "Can Cheap Talk Deter? An Experimental Analysis." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 6 (December): 996–1020.

———. 2011b. "The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization* 65, no. 2: 343–65.

Tomz, Michael. 2007. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization* 61, no. 4: 821–40.

Trager, Robert F., and Lynn Vavreck. 2011. "The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party." *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 3: 526–45.

Trubowitz, Peter. 1992. "Sectionalism and American Foreign Policy: The Political Geography of Consensus and Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 2: 173–90.

Vandello, Joseph A., Dov Cohen, and Sean Ransom. 2008. "US Southern and Northern Differences in Perceptions of Norms about Aggression: Mechanisms for the Perpetuation of a Culture of Honor." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 39, no. 2: 162–77.

Walt, Stephen M. 2013. "We're Going to War Because We Just Can't Stop Ourselves." *Foreign Policy,* August 27. At https://perma.cc/V633-P2LD.

Walter, Barbara F. 2006. "Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others." *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 2: 313–30.

———. 2009. *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent.* New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

Weeks, Jessica Lea, and Dara Kay Cohen. 2009. "Red Herrings? Fishing Trawler Disputes, Regime Types, and Interstate Conflict." Paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, New York, February 15.

Wiegand, Krista E. 2011. "Militarized Territorial Disputes: States' Attempts to Transfer Reputation for Resolve." *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 1: 101–13.

Williams, Jack K. 2000. *Dueling in the Old South: Vignettes of Social History.* College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press.

Wilson, Woodrow. 1916. "President Wilson's Letter to Senator Stone Announcing His Stand on Armed Liner Issue." *New York Times,* February 25: 1.

Wyatt-Brown, Bertram. 1982. *Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South.* New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

———. 2005. "The Ethic of Honor in National Crises: The Civil War, Vietnam, Iraq, and the Southern Factor." *Journal of the Historical Society* 5, no. 4: 431–60.